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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

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Northern Merchant Opinion and the Civil War

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IN the dozen or so years preceding the Civil War, the merchants and businessmen of the North almost without exception held common views regarding the institution of slavery. The business interest then, as now, constituted an important segment of our population, their influence often times being out of proportion to their number. This, if nothing else, entitles their opinion to some consideration. In this particular case the views of the merchants of the city of New York can be taken as typical of Northern business opinion in general.¹ In this respect only one qualification need be made—New York, being the nation's center of commerce, had more at stake than other cities, and consequently bred stronger and more positive feelings on the issues involved.

Before the late 1840's there was no such thing as solid merchant opinion; most merchants, as such, were indifferent because they did not clearly see the economic relationship between Southern slavery and Northern business. A handful of them, while willing to accept slavery as an existing institution under the sanction of the constitution, were opposed to the extension of slavery into new territories. They believed such extension to be politically and economically dangerous to their interests, politically dangerous because of the additional representation in Congress, and economically dangerous because slave states were not considered to be as good markets in the long run as free states.² As early as

1819 some merchants were sponsoring mass meetings to prevent the spread of slavery "into states and territories hereafter to be organized in the wide domain of the United States."³ Such meetings took place periodically from this time up to the Civil War, but they were the work of a small group, not of the merchants as a class.⁴

A second handful of merchants, the most prominent of whom were Lewis and Arthur Tappan, were firm believers in abolition. The Tappan brothers joined abolitionist societies and donated rather large sums of money to this cause.⁵ Again, these men did not represent the merchant class as a whole; on the contrary, they were despised and disowned by many of their fellow merchants. Thus in the years before 1850 there were some few merchants in the abolitionist ranks, a few more who were willing to accept slavery as they found it providing it would not be extended into new lands; the remainder had varying opinions or none at all. In short, there was no such thing as a majority opinion on slavery among the merchants, unless it was indifference.

The situation after 1850 presents a decided contrast. Not only was there a single prevailing opinion among the merchants, but the opinion was a strong one, clearly expressed and rabidly defended. This solidarity of opinion grew directly out of a single conviction of the merchants, that not only their wealth and prosperity but their very existence as businessmen depended upon a peaceful settlement of the slavery controversy.⁶ They became vividly aware of the many economic ties between southern cotton and northern business, ties which would be broken at great cost to the merchants if the union were disrupted. Newspapers, journals, books, and pamphlets played a large part in the development of that conviction. The New York papers pointed out to the merchants that New York was simply a prolongation of the South; that many cords of interest bound the city to the southern slaveholder; that without slavery hundreds of northern factories would cease to operate,

³ Quoted in Foner, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁴ Bayard Tuckerman, ed., *The Diary of Phillip Hone*, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1859). Sept. 9, 1850. Phillip Hone was a wealthy New York merchant who was in an excellent position to know the opinions of his fellow merchants. His home was the center of a great deal of social activity and was the stopping place for many prominent men when visiting New York, among them Webster and Clay. He began to keep a diary in 1828 which was not intended for publication and was never edited or corrected by Hone himself. Unfortunately it does not go past April 30, 1851, but it is valuable for merchant opinion during the forties and on the Compromise of 1850.

⁵ Gilbert Barnes, *The Anti-Slavery Impulse, 1830-1844* (New York: 1933). Northern businessmen who were also abolitionists are discussed in chapter 2.

⁶ J. A. Scoville, *The Old Merchants of New York City* (New York: Carleton, 1864), IV, 134ff.

¹ Thomas Kettell, *Southern Wealth and Northern Profits* (New York: C. and J. Wood, 1860), *passim*. This work represents the type of argument Kettell and his fellow southerners were using to convert the northern merchants to their way of thinking. The economic theory that Kettell proposes has been treated in the bulk of the paper. His arguments for slavery are not at all convincing, and his statistics are not obviously consistent with his conclusions. Nevertheless he proves to his own satisfaction and to that of the northern merchants that the commerce and manufacturing of the cities of the North increased proportionately as did the value of slaves and cotton. He does not confine his treatment to the city of New York alone, and thus helps to justify the belief that the opinions of the New York businessmen varied but little from northern business opinion in general. See also J. D. De Bow, *The Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States*, 3 vols. (New Orleans: De Bow's Review, 1853). These three volumes consist of a collection of articles that once appeared in De Bow's Review. Many of the articles are unsigned, many untitled. In general they contain sufficient statistics to show that New York and other northern cities were tied up commercially with the South. These articles and others similar to them contributed a great deal toward the formation of the opinion of the New York businessmen.

² Freeman Hunt, *Lives of American Merchants* (Cincinnati: Derby and Jackson, 1858), *passim*. This book is a series of short biographical essays on prominent merchants, without regard to locality. Opinions and points of view can be culled out of it. See also Phillip Foner, *Business and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941). This is by far the best single volume dealing with the relationship of northern merchants to slavery. It is extremely well written and well documented, with an extensive bibliography.

thousands would be without work.⁷ Without slavery, the New York Daily News said of New York, "ships would rot at their docks; grass would grow in Wall Street and Broadway, and the glory of New York, like that of Babylon and Rome, would be numbered with the things of the past".⁸ Newspapers without doubt had their influence, but the articles in some of the leading journals were even more influential. According to DeBow's Review, the Alabama legislature had in 1830 appointed a committee to investigate the profits New York made from southern cotton. The results showed that New York received one-third of the total profits.⁹ A similar study made in 1850 revealed that New York was by that time taking 40% of the total profits from southern cotton.¹⁰ Virginia alone was paying over nine million dollars a year to the New York businessmen.¹¹ The North had invested heavily in the railroads of the South, especially of Virginia, and had also invested heavily in the mines of Alabama and Georgia.¹² New York money was even invested in slaves and slave plantations.¹³ The New York Journal of Commerce pointed out to the merchants the immense amount of manufactured goods they sold each year in the South, seventy-six million dollars worth in the single year of 1849.¹⁴ And what was equally important, this trade was carried in northern ships which returned with cargoes of cotton, part of which provided raw material for northern factories and the remainder of which was re-exported at great profit to the North.¹⁵

Pamphleteers were also active in convincing northern businessmen of their necessary relationship with the South. Muscoe Garnett¹⁶ painted a dreary picture of New York business without slavery, claiming that the North had always been and would always be dependent on the South for its prosperity. Thomas Kettell¹⁷ added the British threat, by claiming that England was working for disunion because in an independent South northern manufacturers would not have the protection of a tariff and consequently could be undersold by the British. Kettell also put forth a rather convincing economic theory¹⁸ based on his belief that labor was the basis of wealth in any country. The South, because it had the bulk of the nation's labor supply (slaves), was therefore responsible for any wealth that the nation happened to possess. The North, simply because it had gained control of shipping, manufacturing, banking and the like, had succeeded in accumulating most of the nation's capital. Without southern labor, however, no

such capital could exist; so if the North and South separated, or if the South lost its slaves, the North would soon cease to prosper. In short, to disrupt the union or to destroy slavery would be commercial suicide.

Whether or not the North needed the South as much as the newspapers, pamphlets and journals seemed to indicate is not as important as the fact that the merchants of the North were convinced that such was the case; and, except for a very small group who remained determined abolitionists, they formed their opinions and acted accordingly. They were convinced that the Union must be preserved at all costs by soft-pedaling the slavery issue, by moderation and compromise. The constitutional right of the South to hold slaves had to be recognized. Any attempt to disrupt the Union had to be squelched, and consequently those taking a strong stand on slavery, like the abolitionists, had to be put down. The extension of slavery into new lands was opposed for the economic reason mentioned earlier. Slavery passed from the realm of ethics into that of economics. The following quotation of a merchant speaking to an abolitionist is indicative of the majority opinion of the merchants during the 1850's:

Mr. May, we are not such fools as not to know that slavery is a great evil, a great wrong. But a great portion of the property of the Southerners is invested under its sanction; and the business of the North, as well as of the South, has become adjusted to it. There are millions upon millions of dollars due from Southerners to the merchants and mechanics, alone, the payment of which would be jeopardized by any rupture between the North and the South. We cannot afford, sir, to let you and your associates endeavor to overthrow slavery. It is not a matter of principles with us. It is a matter of business necessity. . . .¹⁹

The first major event of the 50's that shows the merchants' adherence to the opinions indicated above was the compromise of 1850. This they supported by mass meetings such as the one held on the 18th of February, 1850, which was called to "sustain Mr. Clay's compromise".²⁰ Twenty-five thousand merchants signed the petition that was drawn up.²¹ The position of the merchants was indicated by Van Schaick, a leading dry goods merchant, who claimed that the "dissolution of the Union would transfer some of our best customers to another market for supplies", and that Northern extremists "would destroy all this prosperity at one blow".²² To prevent this, the merchants believed they had to support the compromise.²³ To further support said compromise, \$10,000 was contributed toward the foundation of a newspaper, the Albany State Register, which would back Mr. Clay's plan.²⁴ According to the Weed Papers of September 4, 1850, this activity on the part of the merchants aided in getting the New York delegation in Congress to support Clay.²⁵

In keeping with their spirit of compromise the merchants enthusiastically supported Webster's nationalistic appeal to save the Union, his so-called Seventh of March

⁷ Foner, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁸ *New York Daily News*, Dec. 20, 1850.

⁹ De Bow, *op. cit.*, III, p. 93.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ De Bow's Review, XIV, p. 501.

¹² *Ibid.*, XXVIII, p. 332, XVIII, p. 523.

¹³ *Ibid.*, XXIX, p. 204.

¹⁴ *New York Journal of Commerce*, Dec. 12, 1849.

¹⁵ Robert Albion, *The Rise of the Port of New York, 1815-1860* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1939), Chapter 6 shows the position of the New York port in relation of the cotton trade.

¹⁶ Muscoe Garnett, *The Union, Past and Future, How it Works and How to Save it*, *De Bow's Review*, XVIII, 289, 432, 601.

¹⁷ Thomas Kettell, "Union—Its Stability," *Industrial Resources* etc., III, 356.

¹⁸ See page 1, footnote 1.

¹⁹ Samuel May, *Some Recollections of Our Anti-Slavery Conflict* (Boston: 1869), p. 127-8.

²⁰ Foner, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 26. Also *New York Journal of Commerce*, Feb. 21, 1850.

²² *Ibid.*, June 10, 13, 1850.

²³ Foner, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Espartero and the British Foreign Office, 1838-1843

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GENERAL BALDIMIRO ESPARTERO was one of the most colorful of the military *políticos* of modern Spanish history. A Liberal, who came to power by his popularity with the army and the middle classes, he was a deciding factor in every Spanish issue from 1838 to 1843.¹ The appraisal of his actions as influenced by Palmerston and Aberdeen, and by Guizot and Louis-Philippe will give an important insight into a critical period of Spanish constitutional history.

During the closing years of the disastrous Carlist War, Espartero was the most prominent field general of the constitutionalist forces. He was the victim, as were all of Queen Christina's officers, of the political considerations that overrode any idea of strategy in the war. The *Moderado* cabinet was afraid that Espartero, a *Progresista*, might become too powerful and so it kept the army of reserve under Ramon Narváez at a greater strength. The reasons for this inconsistent policy lay in the crooked labyrinth of the Spanish party system. Spain's plunge into democratic institutions had brought into existence various parties: the *Provinciales*, a separatist movement; the *Apostolicos* and *Carlistas*, reactionary and ultra-conservative groups supporting Don Carlos; the *Moderados* and the *Progresistas*. With typical Spanish inability to compromise, these parties fought savagely to gain control of crown policy. Their organization was fluid, since malcontents would frequently shift allegiance. All parties were subdivided into radical and conservative factions on more or less cordial relations with one another.

The *Moderados*, favoring a limited monarchy, tried to navigate a middle course between Carlism and democracy; their membership was Francophile.² The *Progresistas*, who represented the commercial classes, were Liberals without republican tendencies; their chief strongholds were the municipalities. Under Mendizabal and Espartero their aim was to limit the crown's prerogatives and encourage trade relations with England. While both parties had united under the *Cristino* banner during the war, by the spring of 1840 a showdown between them had become a necessary prelude to a permanent peace.

The showdown came quickly. Christina disliked democratic institutions, and a large clique of *Moderados* at her request introduced into the Cortes a bill abolishing the election of municipal officials by making them appointees of the crown. This emasculation of the traditional rights of the municipalities and of the strength of the *Progresistas* might have been accomplished had

the queen won over Espartero in their meeting at Lérida.³ Espartero, however, publicly denounced the bill as unconstitutional. Christina remained firm in her plan and announced the formation of an *ultra-Moderado* cabinet under Modesto Cortazar. With the news of this autocratic decision, revolts sprang up anew and a provisional government was established in Madrid. The *Progresistas* moved quickly and the compromising proof of Christina's marriage to Nuñez, a handsome corporal of the guard, was used to force her resignation of the regency.⁴ The queen made her "voluntary abdication" on October 12, 1840, and on May 18, 1841, Espartero became regent. With this turn of events, Britain's Iberian policy of the past decade reached its greatest success.

This Iberian policy had two main objectives, an independent Spain with Liberal parliamentary institutions and commercial treaties that would grant England equality in the competitive market. By an extension of the Quadruple Alliance on August 18, 1834, the king of the French undertook to prevent supplies from reaching the *Carlistas*, while Britain agreed to furnish the *Cristinos* with arms and, if necessary, naval support.⁵ In his continental strategy, Palmerston had set great store on the formation of a "Liberal bloc" in the west. He wrote to Temple: England, France, Belgium, Portugal and Spain looked upon merely as a mass of opinion, form a powerful body in Europe."⁶ In Parliament he had said previously: "Constitutional states I consider to be the natural allies of this country, and no English ministry will perform its duty, if it be inattentive to the interests of such states."⁷ These sentiments are in line with Palmerston's oft-criticized jingoism, and they represent a pursuance of Canning's Portuguese policy on a peninsular scale.

Palmerston was constantly urging the reluctant Louis Philippe to aid in the *Cristino* cause, although the citizen king preferred to give no more than lip service to the cause of Liberalism. In fact, the fundamental doctrinaire conflict between the two countries was brought into sharp relief at this time. Palmerston believed that by leaving Spain independent, the impulse to follow French initiative by the court at Madrid would be weakened. France was afraid that the defeat of Don Carlos would be the doorway to a non-Bourbon ascendancy in Spain. A Coburg could be wed to the queen!

³ Cf. Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 216; R. Sencourt, *The Spanish Crown* (London, 1932), pp. 166-7, has a detailed account.

⁴ Until that time, the belief that she was Nuñez' mistress had allowed her to keep the Regent's powers. Sencourt, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

⁵ Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

⁶ Palmerston to Temple, October 8, 1833. H. Temperley & L. Penson, *Foundations of British Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, 1938), p. 105.

⁷ Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd Series, XIV, 1045, Aug. 2, 1832.

¹ "Espartero now forms one of the bodies of the state," Southern to Palmerston, July 27, 1839. Cf. John Hall, *England Under the Orleans Monarchy* (London, 1912), p. 215.

² The *Estatuto Real* of 1834 of Martinez de la Rosa, a guiding spirit of the *Moderado* party, is a typical example of their principles. They were the Spanish exponents of the "juste milieu".

Louis-Philippe, therefore, remarked to Granville that the triumph of absolutism under Don Carlos might still be useful. Under a Liberal monarchy "the peninsula would become the resort of all the revolutionists and republicans in Europe."⁸ France, however, was faced with isolation if English friendship was openly abandoned, since the absolutist Münchengrätz Alliance, for all the conservatism of the citizen king, was never cordial.

Palmerston had to take the initiative in Anglo-French cooperation at this time. The Foreign Office was under constant pressure from the British manufacturers whose woollens and linen would have ordinarily had a fine market, but for the mercantilist tariff then enforced in Spain.⁹ England was aiming at a Spanish independence in its most fundamental sense. "Not an Austrian, nor a French Spain, but a Spain definitely Spanish,"¹⁰ was the state most likely to listen to the call of Liberalism and free markets, and remain useful to the proper balance of power. To implement this intention a British Legion, 10,000 strong, under the command of Colonel De Lacy Evans was authorized to help under the standard of Christina.¹¹ By the winter of 1838, the English press was airing complaints from the soldiers over their lack of pay, or editorializing for the benefit of the commercial class against the prohibitory Spanish tariffs.¹² The Convention of Vergara announced the end of the Carlist War in the summer of 1839 and the British troops returned home, but the commercial treaty, for a variety of reason as we shall see, was unobtainable during the regency of Espartero.

Hardly had Espartero entrenched himself in office, when his ardent supporter in the Foreign Office, Lord Palmerston, was removed by the fall of the Second Melbourne Cabinet in September, 1841. Aberdeen, the new Foreign Secretary, was not in sympathy with Palmerston's liberal crusade and had sharply criticized the sending of the British Legion into Spain.¹³ Staunchly conservative, he considered the past Iberian policy of England "disorganizing and revolutionary".¹⁴ He hoped for a liaison with French conservative interests in a joint peninsular policy. He wrote at this time:

I believe that a conservative policy, so long as it is not founded on interests exclusively French, would be supported in this country. I think, too, that our ministers are beginning to be ashamed of their radicalism in Spain.¹⁵

Although he was on good terms with the rest of the cabinet, Lord Aberdeen was sick in body and tired of

politics; he considered the Foreign Office a "treadmill".¹⁶ This attitude tempered his zeal in forwarding British imperialism. He was particularly anxious to cooperate with Guizot whom he liked personally,¹⁷ and to restore French amity wounded by Palmerston's coup of 1840 in the Eastern Mediterranean. Guizot seems to have wished for the same cordiality, but the press and the chambers had remained Anglophobe after the downfall of the Francophile Mehemet Ali. Louis-Philippe, moreover, was still more interested in appearing in a good light in Vienna than in London.¹⁸ But under the constant warmth of Aberdeen's overtures, French coolness disappeared, and the Anglo-French *entente* came into being.

Without being aware of it, Aberdeen had isolated Espartero and thrown British support behind the French scheme to restore Christina and her Francophile *Modorado* supporters. Since the Infanta's marriage was assumed widely to be the key to ultimate dominance of the peninsula, France began secretly to aid the *Cristinos* in their efforts to overthrow the Espartero regency. Bulwer suspected a compact whereby Louis-Philippe promised help and Christina undertook to influence the Infanta Isabella to marry one of the king's sons.¹⁹

In October, 1841, an abortive insurrection against the regent broke out in the north. It was discovered by accident and put down with great severity by troops loyal to Espartero. The bitter accusations of the Madrid government against French influence in this affair were met by bland assurances of non-complicity at Paris. Aberdeen tried to pacify both sides, since he was afraid that if Louis-Philippe were backed by the Northern powers, he would embark on a war with Spain.²⁰

It was this insurrection that brought out the haziness and uncertainty of Aberdeen's strategy; he was trying to keep the advantages of Palmerston's policy, without ceasing to be a conservative. He would support Spanish independence but would limit his aid to "moral influence and representations to other states."²¹ He would avoid any single-handed struggle with France over influence below the Pyrenees and he would abandon any personal interest in Espartero; "Provided the regent put an end to acts of butchery, he did not care sixpence for liberalism. They may be as radical as they please."²²

Although Queen Victoria sent the Foreign Secretary a strong memorandum in support of Espartero,²³ Aberdeen did nothing. France, however, continued quietly in its policy of embarrassing the regent. When the new French ambassador to Madrid, M. de Salvandy, insisted

⁸ Granville to Palmerston, November 1, 1833. Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

⁹ Memorials on Spanish neglect of treaties made since 1667, poured into the Board of Trade from 1835-38. See *Sessional Papers*, 1837, XXXIX No. 509.

¹⁰ Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd Series, XXVII, p. 267, Speech of Lord Palmerston, March 10, 1837.

¹¹ Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-3.

¹² In 1836, Villiers had on his own initiative signed a convention securing a British loan to Spain in return for a reduction of tariff duties, but the fall of the Mendizabal cabinet prevented ratification. See Herbert Maxwell, *Life of 4th Earl of Clarendon* (London, 1913), I, 94-5.

¹³ Ernest Parry, "The Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven," *Third Camden Series*, LX (London, 1938), pp. 31-36. (Hereafter C. A. L.) Aberdeen to Lieven, June 16, 1835.

¹⁴ Aberdeen to Lieven, November 8, 1833, C. A. L., pp. 12-13.

¹⁵ Aberdeen to Lieven, December 12, 1840, C. A. L., p. 156.

¹⁶ Ernest Parry, "A Review of the Relations between Guizot and Aberdeen," *History*, XXIII, 27.

¹⁷ Aberdeen to Lieven, April 24, 1840, C. A. L., p. 139; September 7, 1841, C. A. L., p. 177.

¹⁸ Parry, *History*, XXIII, 28-29.

¹⁹ Bulwer to Palmerston, April 23, 1841, Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

²⁰ Bulwer to Aberdeen, November 8, 1841, *Ibid.*, p. 339.

²¹ Aberdeen to Aston, November 18, 1841, Ernest Parry, *The Spanish Marriages* (London, 1936), p. 25.

²² Aberdeen to Aston, December 4, 1841, *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²³ "Her earnest wish is that the English Government should be firm and uphold the Regent . . . Spain should not become subject to French interests." *The Letters of Queen Victoria, 1837-1861*, First Series (London, 1907), I, 438.

(Please turn to page sixty-three)

The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942

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WERE one a prophet he might venture to say that posterity will some day look back to the administration of the second Roosevelt, even as it has done to that of the first, and single out, above all things, the conservation of natural resources as the outstanding achievement of the years 1933 to 1946. It is the purpose of this paper to deal with the one small aspect of this work accomplished by the Civilian Conservation Corps. We say one small aspect, because it must be remembered that throughout the comparatively brief history of the C. C. C., the United States Forestry Service, with its 6,500 members, continued to carry on its fine work. Again, the C. C. C. was not the only Alphabetized agency of the New Deal to carry on conservation work. In addition, to mention but a few, the A. A. A., W. P. A., P. W. A. and the T. V. A. all had their share in conserving or building up the resources of the country. The first of these, for example, the A. A. A., did much by way of checking soil erosion through the erection of dams and the planting of grasses, shrubs, trees, etc., a program which played no little part in diminishing floods so damaging to the property and lives of our citizens. Our hope is that this paper will add its bit to furthering a deeper understanding of the years of turmoil through which we have just passed, and in particular of the important work of conservation of our natural resources carried on during that time.

The dull, rainy skies under which Franklin Delano Roosevelt pronounced his oath of office on March 4, 1933, were a mirror of the gloom that gripped the minds and hearts of the American people. A few hours earlier Governor Lehman of New York had proclaimed a holiday which was to close the banks and stock exchanges of that state. In short order other states followed suit, and the implication of this drastic action was not lost on people the nation over, rich and poor alike. The country was on the verge of bankruptcy. Here indeed was the nadir; the depression could not possibly go any lower.

The President, in his inaugural address, did not try to cover over matters; he could not if he would. Rather, after a note of encouragement, he admitted that materially the country was in a frightful shape.

Values have shrunk to fantastic levels; taxes have risen; our ability to pay has fallen; government of all kinds is faced by serious curtailment of income; the means of exchange are frozen in the currents of trade; the withered leaves of industrial enterprise lie on every side; farmers find no markets for their produce; the savings of many years in thousands of families are gone. More important, a host of unemployed citizens face the grim problem of existence, and an equally great number toil with little return. Only a foolish optimist can deny the dark realities of the moment.¹

What method the administration would use in remedying these evils the President indicated when he cried out: "The nation asks for action, and action now."² In the earlier stages of the depression, President Hoover and his associates had thought to drive out fear by instilling confidence in the people. And since even such an instrument as the dole on a national scale would militate against this confidence, it was to be frowned upon. Now, as Roosevelt saw it, the time for augmentation, "for changes in ethics alone," was past.³ Something must be done and done immediately. Above all, if conditions were to be bettered, the people must be put to work. Nor was this an impossible task if faced "willingly and courageously."

It can be accomplished in part by direct recruiting by the Government itself, treating the task as we would treat the emergency of a war, but at the same time, through this employment, accomplishing greatly needed projects to stimulate and reorganize the use of our national resources.⁴

Here would be the key to New Deal reconstruction. The people would be helped by the government, not in the form of a dole, but by being given work on much needed projects the country over. In the months that followed many shook their heads at the legislation that flowed from Congress in bewildering fashion. Many thought that the President was being given too much power. Labor cried aloud at what it deemed "regimentation." Pacifists wrote against the seeming militarism towards which we were heading. And the nation as a whole considered that we were fairly on our way toward a dictatorship such as had been formed in Germany, Russia, Italy and Spain. Still, like men on a burning ship, Congressmen and the people with them, held their breath and dove overboard. Any sort of action seemed preferable to being roasted alive in the economic inferno that lay behind them. Interestingly enough the first of the bills for relief of unemployment to pass through Congress in the Spring of 1933 was that which gave birth to the Civilian Conservation Corps.

To quote Secretary of War Dern, President Roosevelt may very truly be called the "father of the Civilian Conservation Corps." In the first place it must be remembered that the idea of conservation was not new to him when he entered the White House. In June, 1934, at a Yale alumni luncheon, Roosevelt recalled how he had been made chairman of the committee on forests, fish and game while still "a youngster in the State Legislature." Thereafter he became very much interested in this assignment which was to start him

² *Public Papers of F. D. R.*, II, 12.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴ Note. More recently some authorities have argued that the New Deal was actually started by Hoover, who had in mind a vast program, which, however, was not able to be carried out due to the change in administration in 1933.

¹ S. I. Rosenman, Comp., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 9 vols. (New York, 1938), II, 11.

"on the conservation road."⁵ This interest led him to the practice of forestry on his own estate at Hyde Park, which he turned into a national park, so to speak, on a miniature scale.⁶ Later, towards the end of his governorship, he used some ten thousand unemployed persons on the tree nurseries and planting crews of his native state.⁷ This policy he defended at Atlanta while campaigning for the presidency.

"It is common sense and not fantasy to invest our money in tree crops, just as much as to grow annual agricultural crops. The return on the investment is just as certain in the case of growing trees as it is in the case of growing cotton, or wheat, or corn."⁸

Once president, Roosevelt lost no time in putting his ideas into effect on a national scale. On March 15, 1933, he explained to the press that his idea was "to put people to work in national forests and on other Government and State properties on work which would not otherwise be done; in other words, work that does not conflict with existing so-called public works."⁹ Roosevelt explained how we were using lumber to the extent of four times the rate of annual growth, a decided danger to our future self-sufficiency. The idea would be to send men into our vast areas of scrub growth to weed out crooked or dead trees, thus giving the saplings a chance to grow. Fire breaks and other preventive measures would be established to check annual losses hitherto quite alarming. The men to be chosen for the work would be people on the dole, people barely supported by community and state agencies. It was pointed out that such a measure would help to relieve the families of the men back home, since a large part of the pay was to be remitted. This in turn would benefit the community as well.¹⁰

All this Roosevelt explained to Congress in his message of March 21, 1933. In asking for authority to put his plan into operation, whereby some 250,000 men would be given temporary employment by early summer, he asked for no new funds. Rather, the unobligated funds set aside for public works would suffice for several months.

This enterprise is an established part of our national policy. It will conserve our precious natural resources. It will pay dividends to the present and future generations. It will make improvements in national and state domains which have been largely forgotten in the past few years of industrial development. More important, however, than the material gains will be the moral and spiritual value of such work. . . . It is not a panacea for all the unemployment but it is an essential step in this emergency.¹¹

In commenting on the President's message the *New York Times* felt that there could be "no doubt of the sincerity and even enthusiasm of the President in urging this scheme." But at the same time the *Times* expressed a doubt as to whether it would "be received with zealous approval in Congress."¹² In point of fact the debate on the bill in both houses proved to be a rather stormy affair. Many congressmen thought with Secretary of Agriculture Arthur M. Hyde that the pro-

posal was of an "utterly visionary and chimerical character."¹³ It was from labor, however, that the most bitter opposition was to come. President Green of the A. F. of L. expressed the belief that:

This is military control in itself. There is your regimentation, the very principles against which labor has always vigorously contended. It smacks, as I see it, of fascism, of Hitlerism, of a form of sovietism.¹⁴

In the House the opposition was led by Representative Connery of Massachusetts, chairman of the Labor Committee. Mr. Connery was opposed to the low wages to be paid, and would have offered a substitute bill which would give \$50.00 a month to single men, and \$80.00 to married men, instead of the proposed basic pay of \$30.00 for all. In answer to this, Representative Byrnes showed that the proposal was not meant to be a labor question at all, but a matter of relief. There was no question of Congress trying to fix a wage standard for industry as such.¹⁵

Gradually the majority of congressmen swung around to the President's way of thinking. People began to speak of his great humanitarian interest and his far-sightedness in the matter. Finally on March 28, the Senate passed the bill (S598), which bore the title: "Bill for the relief of unemployment through the performance of useful public work, and for other purposes."¹⁶ On March 29 the House took up the Senate document and passed it after making a few minor changes,¹⁷ and on the day following the Senate concurred in the House amendments.¹⁸ According to the final draft of the bill, the President was authorized to provide for employing citizens of the United States who are unemployed, in the construction, maintenance and carrying out of works of a public nature in connection with the forestation of lands belonging to the United States or to the several States which are suitable for timber production, the prevention of forest fires, floods and soil erosion, plant pest and disease control, the construction, maintenance or repair of paths, trails and fire lanes in the national parks and national forests, and such other work on the public domain, national and State, and Government reservations incidental to or necessary in connection with any projects of the character enumerated. . . .¹⁹

On April 5, 1933, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 6101, setting up the Civilian Conservation Corps in accordance with the powers granted him by Congress.²⁰ Robert Fechner, labor leader and general vice-president of the International Association of Machinists, was chosen Director of Emergency Conservation Work at a salary of \$12,000 a year. In this task he was to be aided by an advisory council of four, one appointed from each of the departments of War, Agriculture, Interior and Labor.²¹ To the Department of Labor was given the task of selecting the enrollees, whence they were to be sent to the War Department for

¹³ For Hyde's Attitude cf. Harper, *Administration of the C. C. C.*, p. 7.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁵ For an interesting report on the debate cf., *New York Times*, March 30, 1933.

¹⁶ *Congressional Record*, 77, Part 1, 937.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 995.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1013.

¹⁹ Conrad L. Wirth, *Civilian Conservation Corps Program of the U. S. Department of the Interior*, Report January, 1944 (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.), 1945, p. 15.

²⁰ *Public Papers of F. D. R.*, II, 107, 108.

²¹ *Ibid.*

⁵ Charles Price Harper, *The Administration of the Civilian Conservation Corps* (Clarksburg, W. Va., 1939), pp. 5, 6.

⁶ *New York Times*, April 30, 1933, Sec. 8, p. 1, col 3.

⁷ Harper, *Administration of the C. C. C.*, p. 7.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁹ *Public Papers of F. D. R.*, II, 68.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Third Press Conference, March 15, 1933, pp. 69-71.

¹¹ *Congressional Record*, 77, Part 1, 650.

¹² *New York Times*, Wednesday, March 22, 1933, Editorial.

actual enrollment. In this task of selection the Department of Labor was to be aided by existing state relief and welfare organizations. The 25,000 war veterans provided for in the act were to be selected by the Veterans Administration.²²

Considering the impatience of the President to get the C. C. C. started, the heaviest task fell on the War Department. To it was given "the job of paying, housing, clothing and feeding the men of the camps."²³ By special order of the executive (No. 6106, April 10, 1933), the chief of finance of the department became fiscal officer; the quartermaster general would take care of the material needs of the enrollees; the surgeon general of the Army was to see to all medical affairs of the venture. In this last detail the Navy was to lend its aid. On May 13, 1933, 169 naval surgeons on duty were assigned to the C. C. C., and on May 31 other naval doctors and dentists were called for duty in the already fast growing camps.

It may be noted here that work was actually begun in the first camp to be set up by the War Department, in George Washington National Forest, Virginia, only ten days after the President's order establishing the C. C. C. Journalists throughout the country were at one in their praise of the Army's fine work. Thus W. S. Buel, writing for *Literary Digest*, remarked that:

The task of mobilizing, examining, enrolling, conditioning, feeding, clothing, equipping, paying, disciplining and hospitalizing 275,000 forest-camp recruits of the Civilian Conservation Corps is the Army's initial contribution to the New Deal. In an era in which economics overshadow every other consideration in American national life, it is a tribute to the Army that it was the one institution available for this vast peace-time maneuver wholly non-military in purpose, but in its operation paralleling a military mobilization.²⁴

Similarly, a certain Captain X writing for *Harpers Magazine* compared the work of the Army on this occasion with the mobilization of troops in 1917. Pointing out what was done in 1933, he considered that in the present instance "a bigger task was done in the same time."²⁵ Certainly the President had every reason to be elated with what General Douglas MacArthur was to call "the greatest peacetime demand ever made upon the Army." Well merited indeed was the latter's commendation: "It was well done, Army."²⁶

In a certain sense the duties of the Department of Agriculture and those of the Interior were no less difficult than those of the War Department. To them fell the charge of "planning the work projects, recommending camp locations and supervising the work programs."²⁷ No easy task this. It is true that there was a tremendous amount of work to be done, but this very fact plus the element of haste only added to the confusion of the moment. Later there were to be some charges of inefficiency and waste of man-time and labor. The wonder is that so very much was accom-

plished, as indeed it was, in the first six months of the C. C. C.

In the months that followed a series of executive orders came from the President. Thus, for example, in May provisions were made for purchasing and financing lands to be added to the national forests. C. C. C. men were applied to work in county and municipal parks. Funds were allocated to be used by the corps "in restoration, acquisition, improvement and development of wild-life refuges."²⁸ Evidently the President was very much interested in his conservation program, and though his orders would make an interesting study in themselves, we shall have to pass them by here. However, much of what they contained may be gathered from the following treatment of the accomplishments of the Civilian Conservation Corps.

In August, 1934, the *Literary Digest* expressed very nicely the sentiment of the American public. "It is noteworthy," it said, "that attacks on the New Deal, no matter how sweeping, rarely or never extend to the Civilian Conservation Corps."²⁹ A few years later this same periodical could still call this institution the "least criticized and most highly praised of all New Deal alphabetized agencies."³⁰ The reason for this is clear, for, judging the C. C. C. in the light of Pope's saying:

In every work regard the writer's end;
None e'er can compass more than they intend.

Then, considering its accomplishments, it was eminently successful. And, as far as the normal American is concerned, "nothing succeeds better than success."

The purpose of the Civilian Conservation Corps was, briefly, to take the young men of the nation off the streets and to put them to work on useful government projects. In this way a twofold end would be accomplished: their own rehabilitation, personal and financial, and the furtherance of conservation work in the forests and fields of our country. Concerning the financial angle, it might be pointed out that, previous to January 1, 1941, enrollees sent \$22.00 to \$25.00 to dependents out of a basic pay of \$30.00 a month. In this way it was estimated that, shortly after the opening of the camps, some 315,000 families were being kept out of "humiliation and want."³¹ Now, it will be remembered that \$22.00 would go a long way towards helping support a family during the days of the depression.

From the very first those in authority showed themselves concerned with the matter of personal rehabilitation of the boys in their charge. The over-all results of the program in this respect have been somewhat doubtful. C. C. C. authorities have pointed with pride to the large numbers of their boys who, having mastered a useful trade while in camp, were able to go back home and get themselves jobs as truck drivers,

²² *Ibid.*, p. 109.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ W. S. Buel, "The Army Under the New Deal," *The Literary Digest*, 116 (August 26, 1933), 3, 4, 28. Also cf. U. S. Government Publication, *Activities of the C. C. C.*, July 1, 1938-June, 1939.

²⁵ Captain X, "A Civilian Army in the Woods," *Harpers Magazine*, 168 (March, 1934), 487-497.

²⁶ Buel, *The Literary Digest*, loc. cit.

²⁷ *Public Papers of F. D. R.*, II, 109.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ "Critics Keep Their Hands Off the C. C. C.," in *Topics of the Day*, *Literary Digest*, 118 (August 18, 1934), 8.

³⁰ "C. C. C.: Least Criticized New Deal Unit," *Literary Digest* (April 18, 1936), 48.

³¹ *Literary Digest*, 118 (August 18, 1934), 8. Note. By 1931 the depression had pretty well passed, and with better conditions the boys received more money in cash, part of the remainder being deposited in their name until discharge, when they were given the balance.

carpenters, surveyors, masons, cooks, and the like. And no doubt this is true. Again, in December, 1933, an educational director was appointed for each camp to see to the intellectual betterment of the enrollees. Writing five years after that date, Howard W. Oxley paints a rather glowing picture of the results. He says:

During the past five years, since the organization of the educational program, 70,000 illiterate enrollees have been taught to read and write. More than three-quarters of a million have been enrolled in elementary, high school and college courses, and 8838 have obtained eighth-grade certificates; 2307 have graduated from high school, and 52 have completed college.³²

However, these statistics submitted by Mr. Oxley, who incidentally was Director of C. C. C. Camp education, would seem to be a trifle misleading. A priori we would expect boys, who had worked hard in the open all the day long, to be more interested in bed, or at most in a game of gin-rummy or poker, than in algebra or business law or accounting. The stress that was laid on bettering the education program during the last days of the C. C. C. would seem to indicate that all was not quite as it should have been in this regard. It is safe to say that, for the vast majority of the enrollees, what education betterment was garnered was in the acquiring of practical skills, work experience, leadership, travel, etc.

Furthermore, there can be no doubt that life in the open, and the contact with the beauties of nature it involved, had its good effect on the physical and moral growth of the majority of the boys of the C. C. C. Unfortunately this was not always the case. According to the original plan, the chief of chaplains of the Army was to supervise the religious activities of the various camps. However, the amount of attention actually devoted to the boys seems to have varied somewhat in different localities. One writer tells us that:

Catholic, Protestant and Jewish clergymen conduct religious services in the camps and meet other religious requirements when necessary. Volunteer clergymen are also brought to the camps when it is considered necessary or advisable.³³

Professor Waddell of Notre Dame, who taught "practical subjects—advertising, journalism, salesmanship"—at a local C. C. C. camp, found religious conditions in the camp to be abominable. He tells us that he has never seen a priest in this camp. An Army minister-chaplain calls monthly, tells the boys a few jokes, and warns them about the women in town. But he seems more set on impressing them with his good fellowship than imbuing them with any eternal truths to live by. The boys can go to church Sundays . . . A struggling few make the trip.³⁴

Many Catholic boys were no exception to the rule. With their companions they felt that "you have to be tough to get along" in the C. C. C., and as they saw it church-going did not help any in this regard. Waddell goes on to show the inevitable result of this lack of religion on the conduct of the boys. He tells us that their visits to prostitutes were "as predictable as pay day," with prophylactics to be found on open display at the commissary.³⁵

³² Howard W. Oxley, "American Youth Learn by Doing," *The Journal of the N. E. A.*, 28 (April, 1939), 111, 112.

³³ "Eight Years of C. C. C. Operation, 1933 to 1941," *Monthly Labor Review*, 52 (June, 1941), 1405-1413.

³⁴ Paul R. Waddell, *Christianity in the C. C. C.*, *Commonweal* (March 3, 1939).

³⁵ *Ibid.*

During the week of April 7, 1941, the C. C. C. celebrated its eighth anniversary by holding a sort of "open house" for the public in some 1,481 camps stretched from coast to coast.³⁶ The following summary shows quite clearly that the officers of that agency might well have been proud of the accomplishments of their boys. This summary is not meant to be all-embracing, but it will give a fairly adequate idea of how far-reaching the work really was.

In connection with the General Land Office, the C. C. C. did some excellent work in bringing under control and extinguishing "out-crop fires" in the nation-owned coalbeds in Wyoming. Some of these fires had been burning for years, perhaps even centuries, eating their way through millions of tons of coal. Some twenty-five of these fires were entirely extinguished while others were checked by the corps.³⁷ The results of this work are simply incalculable. It was in connection with this same office that the C. C. C. did its fine work in forest-fire prevention, by actually fighting such fires and by taking means to curb their destructive forces in the future. Where fires had already taken their toll, new trees were planted. Thomas C. Havell makes the statement that:

The benefits derived from the C. C. C. program operated by the General Land Office are beyond measure. The results will be felt for generations by reason of salvaging of manpower and the conservation of our resources.³⁸

As early as June 19, 1933, our Indians began to have a share in C. C. C. activities. This was done through the Department of Interior's Office of Indian Affairs. All that has been said about rehabilitation and education certainly applies here. Furthermore, the amount of good will alone acquired by this conduct of affairs would have been sufficient to warrant such expenditures as were necessary. In the thirties there was much work to be done on the Indian reservations. Soil erosion had to be checked; forests, ranges and farm lands needed attention. The average Indian has his own idea of what constitutes work, and hence the labor of some 85,000 Indian enrollees did not cause their fellows to become self-sufficient all at once. However, a real beginning was made in this direction. Added help, time and continued education alone can do the rest.

The function of the Bureau of Reclamation has been to develop the dry regions of the western states. The droughts of the early thirties had played havoc with already existing water supplies, so that by 1934 something had to be done quickly. That year a few camps were allotted to the bureau. In 1935 the number was increased to fifty, with the result that, in the years following:

Over 60,000,000 square yards of canals and drainage ditches were placed in good condition by clearing or cleaning; 1,800,000 square yards were lined with impervious materials, and 2,800,000 square yards were reapproped for protection against erosion; operating roads were built along 3,000 miles of canals; 39,000 acres

³⁶ "Eight Years of C. C. C.," *Newsweek*, 17 (April 14, 1941), 23.

³⁷ Thomas C. Havell, Report in *Civilian Conservation Corps Program*, March, 1933, to June, 1943, L. Wirth, Compiler (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1945), p. 23.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

of reservoir sites were cleared of trees and brush, and 15,800 water-control structures in canals and ditches were built.³⁹

The results of such activities have been to bring our federal irrigation projects into an excellent state of repair, at the same time assuring the farmers who depend on them of their permanent reliability.

Most of us have enjoyed, at some time or other, the fruits of C. C. C. labors in our National or State parks, and hence this matter need not be dwelt on here. Certain it is that our citizenry for generations to come will bless the C. C. C. for its work in beautifying these parks, and endowing them with fine roads, picturesque paths and bridges, camp-ground improvements, utility buildings, proper sanitation, and the like.

The C. C. C. also lent effective aid to the U. S. Grazing Service by constructing stock-watering facilities, building trails for trucks or cattle, erecting corrals for holding and loading livestock, etc. The ranges themselves, especially in arid climes, were seeded and protected against the ravages of prairie fires by the erection of "breaks".

Since 1933 the United States has acquired some 8,000,000 acres as a refuge for wild-life. Our total holdings (1942) amounted to 9,570,000 acres with 257 refuges.⁴⁰ Of these latter, forty-four of the larger ones have been set up by the C. C. C. Commenting on this work, Director Gabrielson made the remark that:

Even if the Civilian Conservation Corps should for some unforeseen reason be closed out in the near future, the Fish and Wildlife Service should be forever thankful for what this organization has accomplished for wildlife conservation.⁴¹

In glancing over so formidable a list of works accomplished in so short a time, one can scarcely wonder why the nation as a whole, even those most bitterly opposed to the New Deal, could not bring themselves to criticize the organization that made it all possible.

Why then, one might ask, was the C. C. C. brought to so sudden and unexpected an end? Certainly this was not the idea of the President. As early as September, 1935, at a celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of state conservation at Lake Placid, Mr. Roosevelt remarked that he could see no reason why he should not tell his listeners that

These camps . . . are going to be a permanent part of the policy of the United States Government . . . There is enough work in sight right in this state . . . to continue the work of the C. C. C. camps for a whole generation to come.⁴²

This picture had not changed radically by 1939, so that on January first of that year Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah could safely introduce a bill, which would prolong the life of the C. C. C. indefinitely.⁴³ And yet a few years later the agency was wiped out completely. In the last analysis it was the war, and the "good times" brought on by the war, that were responsi-

ble. This was brought out very nicely by *Newsweek* in June, 1942. After briefly telling about the corps and its beginnings, the article continues:

Then times changed. And the C. C. C. changed likewise. First it drew most of its enrollees from the unemployed youth of the larger cities. But by 1940, 19 per cent of its membership was coming from rural areas. A year later the percentage had risen to 43, with 20 per cent more coming from small towns in farming regions. By last week the trend was causing Rep. Albert J. Engle to voice fears of the farm bloc that this drift would endanger the government's "food-for-freedom" program. The Michigan Republican told the House Committee on Appropriations: "The original purpose of the C. C. C. was to take the boys off the city streets. Instead, it is now taking them off the farms."⁴⁴

In addition to this it was argued that, as a permanent institution, the C. C. C. was not economical—it would pay in the long run to hire regulars to do the work. Though much was said about the corps and its good work in fighting fires, it was pointed out that the few enrollees involved would not add much to this endeavor. Moreover, it was absolutely imperative that expenses be cut down on all non-essentials in order to help the war effort as far as possible.⁴⁵

The debate in the House on the question waxed right merry in early June, 1942. But, in spite of the protests of its devotees that this organization was helping the war cause in its work at army camps and flying fields, the House voted, on June 5, that the camps be discontinued. The Senate then took up the question and the debates in its regard grew even more sharp. On June 24, the Senate Appropriations Committee had voted 15 to 9 to uphold the decision of the House. Nevertheless on June 26, when the votes were cast, the tally was 32 to 32. This enabled Vice-President Wallace to cast his first vote in the Senate. He voted in favor of continuance of the Civilian Conservation Corps for a year, with an appropriation of \$76,529,800.⁴⁶ It looked as though a compromise would have to be made with the House. That body, however, refused to budge; the only concession it would make was an \$8,000,000 liquidation fund. The Senate finally gave in to this on June 30, 1942. Twelve months were to be allowed for the task of demobilization. Equipment, such as trucks, tractors, and the like, was to be turned over to the Army and Navy.

In commenting on the bill of liquidation, the *New York Times* seems almost wistful as it remarks:

Thus will be disbanded the present 350-camp C. C. C., the remnants of one of the most popular of the New Deal establishments which at one time operated 1,500 units all over the country, through which have passed approximately 3,000,000 youths and men.⁴⁷

The attitude of the *Chicago Tribune* was somewhat different, for, though it called the C. C. C. "one of the New Deal's most picturesque experiments, and mentioned some of its fine work,"⁴⁸ still, speaking of the action of the House, it called the day "a landmark in the course of the New Deal."

³⁹ Alfred R. Golze, Report for the Bureau of Reclamation in Wirth, *Civilian Conservation Corps Program*, p. 28.

⁴⁰ P. S. Munk Pederson, Report in Wirth, *Civilian Conservation Corps Program*, p. 36.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁴² *Public Papers of F. D. R.*, IV, 365.

⁴³ "The C. C. C.," *The Journal of the N. E. A.*, 28 (April, 1939), 112.

⁴⁴ "C. C. C.'s Doom," *Newsweek*, 19 (June 15, 1942), 30.

⁴⁵ For the debate in Congress cf. *Congressional Record*, 88, Part 4 (June 5, 1942), 4926 to 4941.

⁴⁶ Cf. *New York Times* (June 27, 1942), 1:5 and 28:2.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1942, 16:2.

⁴⁸ *Chicago Tribune* (June 4, 1942), 8:5.

It was the day on which the House of Representatives voted to abolish the first of the New Deal tax eating agencies to go since 1933 . . . With this action the House has made a promising start towards some badly needed economies.⁴⁹

Evaluation of the C. C. C.

The impartial observer cannot help but feel that the Civilian Conservation Corps accomplished much good throughout the rather brief nine years of its existence. Certainly if we view the results in the light of its purpose and function, then we are bound to admit that at least this one New Deal agency was successful. Looking back we see that the organization was not perfect, that it lacked efficiency in many instances. Much of this no doubt was due to the haste in which it was activated; some failures came from the fact that it was a human, not an angelic, undertaking. Still the C. C. C. actually did do much to alleviate the sufferings of the depression; it did accomplish much in the rehabilitation of our youth, and at the same time it managed to work untold wonders in our National and State parks and reserves. Experts in conservation have stated that the corps advanced our conservation program by as much as twenty-five years.

In all human undertakings one finds results that are not always easy to evaluate in terms of dollars and cents. A good example of this in the case of the C. C. C. has been the stimulation given to public opinion in the appreciation of our magnificent parks the land over, and in the realization that conservation of our national resources is important to our future economy. Prior to 1933 there were no doubt many in the United States, particularly in our great cities, who had never even heard of conservation, let alone the problems involved. Certainly many of these would have been enlightened by newspaper and periodical accounts of the work that was being accomplished in this direction. We say nothing here of the thousands of boys who were made "conservation conscious" by their actual labor in field and forest.

Will the Civilian Conservation Corps be reestablished in years to come? The answer lies in the realm of conjecture. Many think that it would be a good idea to have such a corps at the present time. Conrad L. Wirth, in a report to Harold L. Ickes a few years ago, pointed out that there was still a lot of work to be done in the matter of conservation. He further outlined his scheme for a "Conservation Corps," as he would have it called, a corps which would be a permanent institution in our national life. Thus far, however, nothing has been done in the matter, and it is to be doubted that anything will be done as long as "good times" continue in the economic status of the country. Should we run into a depression in the future, agitation for a second C. C. C. will, no doubt, be renewed. This "least criticized of New Deal agencies" has proven its worth in the past; there is no reason why it should not do so in the event of a future crisis.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, June 6, 1942, "A Promising Start" (Editorial).

Northern Merchant Opinion

(Continued from page fifty-two)

Speech.²⁶ On the grounds that the North was legally bound to do so Webster advocated stringent enforcement of the fugitive slave law. Abolitionists were condemned as unjustly interfering with southern rights. Compromise and concessions to the South were called for as the only means of preserving the Union. All of the merchants except the Tappan-led abolitionists²⁷ strongly supported the speech.²⁸ One enthusiastic merchant declared that the speech would live side by side with the Constitution.²⁹

Additional support for the compromise came late in 1850 when over one hundred leading merchants formed the Union Safety Committee, an organization dedicated to the creation of favorable public opinion on the compromise. Although not specifically a political organization, this committee did on occasion nominate and support men for public office. Ordinarily, however, they simply endorsed any candidate who would pledge himself to compromise.³⁰ Believing Pierce to be so pledged, they supported him in the presidential election of 1852. Pierce carried New York City by more than 11,000 votes,³¹ which brought forth from Horace Greeley the remark that the "cotton merchants" had seriously hampered the Whigs.³² The election of Pierce convinced the merchants that the nation stood solidly behind the Compromise of 1850 and the spirit of moderation. They congratulated themselves because they had worked for compromise, had defended southern rights, had preserved the Union, and by their petitions and mass meetings had demonstrated to the South their friendship. Naively believing that the slavery controversy was at last silent, they turned their attentions from politics to business.

Their false security was shattered in January of 1854 when Douglas introduced into Congress his Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Douglas expected the support of the merchants of the North, for these men had long been demanding a transcontinental railroad via the northern route,³³ and the settlement of Nebraska was a preliminary step to such a project. But as badly as the merchants wanted such a railroad, they wanted peace more. Sacrificing their proposed railroad in order to preserve what they already had, a very profitable relationship with the South, they began to campaign against the bill. Opposition meetings were held, speeches made, petitions circulated, all of which denounced the bill as a violation of the spirit of the Compromise of 1850. Thousands

²⁶ Foster, "Webster's Seventh of March Speech and the Secession Movement," *American Historical Review*, XXVIII, 245ff.

²⁷ "Tappan Correspondence," *Journal of Negro History*, XII, 429.

²⁸ Tuckerman, *op. cit.*, March 14, 1850.

²⁹ Foner, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 55, 56.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ R. S. Cotterill, "Early Agitation for a Pacific Railroad, 1845-50," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, V, 366-415. Also F. H. Hodder, "The Railroad Background of the Kansas-Nebraska Act," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XII, 1-33.

of merchants irrespective of political affiliation met on the 14th of May to decide on a course of action.³⁴ They were convinced by this date that the bill was going to be passed. At this meeting they pledged their support to an immigration fund which would send free settlers to Kansas; more than one hundred thousand dollars was pledged at this time to the Massachusetts Immigrant Aid Company.³⁵ In addition a resolution was adopted which reminded the South that they were alienating their staunchest friends in the North, the merchants; if the southerners pressed the issue the merchants would be forced to unite against them. The resolution then promised to work for the defeat of any anti-compromise candidate, regardless of the party he represented or the office he sought. The stand of the merchants on this Kansas-Nebraska Bill constituted a slight change of position. They seemed not only more willing to adopt a "get tough" attitude toward the South, but they were more willing to blame the southerners for reopening the controversy.³⁶ They took the offensive for once, rather than the apologetic defensive. But this change in policy does not mean that there was a change in opinion. The merchants were still convinced that their prosperity rested with the preservation of the Union and of slavery as it then existed. They were still opposed to violence and devoted to compromise, preaching moderation even to the settlers headed for "bloody Kansas." Their opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Bill stemmed from their intense desire to defend the Compromise of 1850, and also from their belief that slavery should not be extended into new lands.

Agitation over the Kansas-Nebraska Bill had not yet died down when a new problem faced the merchants, the emergency of the new Republican Party. From the start the merchants were opposed to what they called a sectional party which would "embitter half the United States against the other half, thus widening the breach already existing and preparing the ways and means to build up two separate Republics".³⁷ When the Whig Convention, meeting at Syracuse on the 26th of September, 1855, voted to merge with the Republican Party the merchants registered strong protest. On the 4th of October the merchants held a mass meeting condemning the traitorous Whigs who had entered the Republican Party. They made known their intention to keep the Whig Party alive by calling together all anti-fusion Whigs to a convention later the same month. This convention met in New York City, but disbanded when it was seen that the merchants were the only ones very interested in supporting it. Its only result was a statement asking all conservative New Yorkers not to support the Republican candidates in the coming state elections.³⁸ In November the merchants voted and campaigned against the Republicans, who polled only 6,000 votes out of a possible 55,000 in the city of New

York.³⁹ The merchants rejoiced while the Republicans complained, Thurlow Weed crying that "those huge ulcers on the body politic have crushed out Republicanism," and the Albany Evening Journal noting that "we are beaten by the solid vote of New York City".⁴⁰

In the national elections of 1856 the merchants remained anti-Republican. Still keeping one eye on the South and the other on their bankroll, they greatly feared the election of Fremont. Southern propaganda, of which the following letter from a Virginia buyer is an example, shows why: "I can assure you that the time has arrived when the South will insist upon having their equitable rights in the Union considered. And if Fremont is elected, the South will secede."⁴¹ The election returns show that such threats from the South did not go unheeded in the business world. Although Fremont carried the state by a majority of 80,000, he got only 18,000 votes in New York City as compared to Fillmore's 20,000 and Buchanan's 41,000. Thus in the state elections of 1855 and the national elections of 1856 the merchants demonstrated by their political activity that their belief in the status quo, moderation, and compromise was unchanged.

The raid of John Brown late in 1859 serves not only to illuminate merchant opinion, but clearly shows how this opinion stemmed from economic considerations, not from legal or ethical principles. In the business world a great deal of indifference was at first expressed toward the Harper's Ferry incident; even though most of the merchants mildly denounced it, they looked upon it as the work of a handful of lunatics who had best be ignored.⁴² They misread southern sentiment, however, for the southern buyers were waiting for their northern business associates to denounce publicly John Brown's raid as a glittering violation of southern rights.

Their indifference was not their only mistake. Believing that the state and city elections in November were of no real consequence, they along with many others failed even to cast a ballot. Out of 104,000 registered voters only 56,000 showed up at the polls, and the Republicans had an easy victory.⁴³ The election results were interpreted in the South as an endorsement of John Brown and his fellow abolitionists. The Richmond Inquirer complained,

New York City, the emporium of trade, the city supported by southern productions, her merchants enriched by our traffic, her vessels freighted with our produce, the grass kept from her streets and the bats and owls from her warehouses by southern trade, has not made even a decent effort to defeat her enemies, as well as those of the South.⁴⁴

The Atlanta Daily Confederacy began publishing "infamous lists" of business houses that had not defended southern rights and consequently should not be patronized. Buyers' strikes were organized in the South; orders were canceled in large numbers.⁴⁵ As usual when business was threatened, the merchants roused themselves and prepared for action.

³⁴ Foner, *op. cit.*, p. 96ff.

³⁵ Eli Thayer, *The New England Immigrant Aid Company* (Worcester: 1887), pp. 24-5.

³⁶ Foner, *op. cit.*, p. 100ff.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 106-7.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 110-11.

³⁹ *New York Journal of Commerce*, Nov. 3, 1855.

⁴⁰ Quoted in Foner, p. 114.

⁴¹ *New York Journal of Commerce*, Sept. 25, 1856.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Oct. 27, Nov. 1, 4, 1859.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 1-12, 1859.

⁴⁴ Quoted in Foner, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 159-60.

To convince the South of their good faith they called numerous mass meetings. They denounced the "crimes of John Brown and his confederates", condemned the idea of irrepressible conflict as "untrue, unpatriotic, revolutionary and dangerous", claimed that "the North and South were created for each other" and were "to supply each other's wants".⁴⁶ One merchant, Charles O'Connor, went so far as to say that slavery was ordained by nature, carrying with it duties for both white and black, that these duties could only be performed by the perpetuation of Negro slavery. He concluded that slavery was not only necessary but just.⁴⁷ In Rochester a merchant meeting issued a statement to the effect that John Brown's raid was a "treasonable and murderous assault upon the peaceful citizens of Virginia."⁴⁸ Similar resolutions were issued in other northern cities.⁴⁹

The raid of John Brown demonstrates that the opinion of the northern businessmen concerning slavery was unchanged, and it shows, incidentally, that it was an opinion formed through business necessity. It was good business to hold the South in the Union, and the methods they chose were condemnation of trouble-making abolitionists and placation of the South by openly defending southern rights.

The election of 1860 presented a very difficult problem to the merchants. The Republicans, they believed, represented a sectional party which was leading the nation into war. But the Democrats were little better; they had been responsible for the Kansas-Nebraska Bill and had prevented the organization of the House of Representatives in order to prevent the election of a Republican speaker.⁵⁰ Neither party satisfied the merchants' desire for peace and compromise. Most merchants, not knowing what to do, did nothing. The South, however, knowing that New York's electoral votes would greatly help in preventing the election of Lincoln, began to show signs of excited discontent with the inaction of the northern merchants. Pleas and threats began to flow into New York City from southern buyers. A letter from Macon, Georgia, said that "if such an event (the election of Lincoln) should happen, the northern merchants will suffer, for the southern ones won't pay one cent of their northern liabilities".⁵¹ A North Carolinian assured the merchants that the defeat of "the sectional candidate" would mean that the South "would owe you a debt of gratitude more than she will ever be able to pay".⁵² "Use your powerful conservatism and you will have the gratitude of the South" pleaded the New Orleans Picayune.⁵³ Edward Ruffin, a Virginia planter, wrote that the election of Lincoln would mean the loss of millions of dollars to

the North in debts outstanding, that panic and hunger riots would take place all over New York City, that the city would be pillaged and destroyed, and that the merchants who brought all of this on would be massacred.⁵⁴ Needless to say many merchants were alarmed by these threats, but the task of defeating Lincoln was a difficult one. There were three anti-Republican candidates in the field, no one of whom was conceded by the merchants a chance to defeat Lincoln in the state of New York. To the contrary, it looked as though they would only split up the anti-Republican vote, thus aiding Lincoln. The merchants finally decided that the only way out of their difficulty was to effect a union of these groups, the Northern Democrats (Douglas), the Southern Democrats (Breckenridge), and the Constitutional Unionists (Bell). To carry out such a plan was not easy, for there was a great deal of antagonism among the three groups, especially between the supporters of Breckenridge and Douglas.⁵⁵ The merchants made it known, however, "that a union of anti-Republicans must be effected before money can be obtained in New York City for the campaign".⁵⁶ They also made it known that once such a union came about there would be money in abundance. So on September 24, 1860, after much delay and haggling, a fusion ticket was announced consisting of eighteen Douglas electors, ten Bell electors, and seven Breckenridge electors.⁵⁷ The campaign was then directed toward the negative task of preventing Lincoln from getting New York's electoral votes, supporters of the fusion ticket being afraid that positive commitments would destroy their forced and unnatural unity.

The Republicans ignored the merchants' activity until late in the campaign. They had felt earlier that they could never hope to win the merchant vote, but they cared little because they did not see how merchant opposition could do them much harm. But after the fusion ticket was announced, they reconsidered and adopted a very clever double-barreled policy, one barrel aimed at the city of New York, the other at the rural areas. In the latter districts the Republicans used the opposition of the merchants as an excellent selling point. The money-bags of Wall Street were opposed to Lincoln. What better proof that Honest Abe "was a man of the People"?⁵⁸ A vote for Lincoln (in the rural areas) became a vote against the capitalistic vultures of Wall Street.

In the city of New York the Republicans sang a different song. They insisted that they did not represent abolitionism. Slavery, they said, was dying a natural death due to its own dead weight, and it was Republican policy to let it die in peace. Had not the Democrats been the ones to propose such infamous bills as the Kansas-Nebraska Act? And had not the Democrats caused the Panic of 1857 by their extravagant and un-

⁴⁶ *New York Journal of Commerce*, Dec. 8, 13, 1859.

⁴⁷ Emerson Fite, *The Presidential Campaign of 1860* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911), p. 26. This work is extremely well done. So far as merchant opinion is concerned it deals with John Brown, the formation of the Republican party, Republican and Democratic conventions, their campaign arguments, reprints of their platforms and some of their campaign speeches.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 27-8.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Foner, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

⁵² *New York Journal of Commerce*, Aug. 13, 1860.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1860.

⁵⁴ See Foner's treatment, p. 196-7, of Ruffin's *Anticipations of the Future to Serve as Lessons for the Present Time, in the Form of Extracts of Letters from an English Resident in the U. S.*, etc.

⁵⁵ Fite, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁵⁶ Foner, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁵⁸ Foner, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

wise spending? Have they not been so preoccupied with the slavery question that they have forgotten to legislate for the white man and keep the nation's economy on a sound basis? The Democrats have done nothing to solve the nation's problems, continued the Republicans, so why not give us a chance? The election of Lincoln would not cause war; it would avert it! The proponents of Republicanism also made sure that the merchants heard the "correct" interpretation of the Republican platform. The following quotations taken from this platform⁵⁹ were called to the attention of the merchants as being coincidental with the expressed desires of the merchants:

1. "That the maintenance of the principles promulgated in the Declaration of Independence and embodied in the Federal constitution—that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; . . . —is essential to the preservation of our republican institutions; and that the Federal constitution, the rights of the states, and the union of the states must and shall be preserved." This, the Republicans pointed out, shows that the Republican Party was in agreement with the merchants that slavery was a moral wrong, but that the rights of the South would be respected and the Union preserved.

2. "That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially the right of each state to order and control its own domestic institutions . . . is essential . . . and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any state . . . as among the gravest of crimes." Thus the Republicans admitted the right of the South to hold slaves and they denounced by implication such things as the raid of John Brown.

3. "We hold in abhorrence all schemes for disunion . . . and we congratulate the country that no Republican member of Congress has uttered or countenanced the threats of disunion so often made by Democratic members." The Democrats then, and not the Republicans, were working toward a disruption of the Union.

4. "That the dogma that the Constitution . . . carries slavery into any or all of the territories of the United States is a dangerous political heresy . . . and (is) subversive of the peace and harmony of the country." This, of course, coincides with the merchants' opposition to the extension of slavery.

5. "That, while providing revenue for the support of the general government by duties upon imports, sound policy requires such an adjustment of these imports as to encourage the development of the industrial interests of the whole country; . . ." A higher tariff is held out to these northerners as additional bait.

6. "That appropriations by Congress for river and harbor improvements of a national character, required for the accommodation and security of our existing commerce, are authorized by the Constitution . . . that a railroad to the Pacific Ocean is imperatively demanded by the interests of the whole country; that the Federal government ought to render immediate and efficient aid

in its construction." Anything facilitating commerce naturally appealed to the merchants, and we have already noted their interest in a transcontinental railroad.

One last argument used by the Republicans is deserving of mention. They told the merchants that the defeat of Lincoln in the state of New York would throw the election into the House of Representatives, where the slavery controversy would be reopened and a president elected only after much costly and dangerous delay.

It is rather difficult to understand how such propaganda failed to convince more merchants that it was to their best interests to vote Republican. For the above-mentioned Republican platform and campaign arguments constituted a rather good summary of the opinions held by the northern merchants during the pre-Civil War decade. Slavery was condemned on moral grounds, but was considered to be basically a legal and economic problem rather than a moral one. So the best policy was to prevent its extension, but to recognize and accept it where it existed. Peaceful solution of the slavery controversy was made synonymous with preservation of the Union. Thus northern abolitionists must be checked while southern extremists must to a certain extent be placated; the defeat of Lincoln would do both. But in spite of all the Republican propaganda the merchants cast their ballots and their support against Lincoln.⁶⁰ The explanation for this lies in the simple fact that southern threats and order cancellations influenced the merchants more than did the Republican propaganda. Although Lincoln did not gain a majority of the vote in the city of New York,⁶¹ he did win a state-wide majority and thus got New York's electoral votes. Even in victory, however, many Republican leaders were bitter toward the merchants, one spokesman complaining that the merchant desertion of Lincoln was due to their becoming "frightened at the cry of wolf".⁶²

The campaign and election of 1860⁶³ serves not only as another example of merchant opinion on slavery but also as proof that the business interest viewed slavery in 1861 in essentially the same light as they had in 1850. Throughout the period their belief was moderation, compromise, concession, preservation of the Union; their motive was dollars and cents.

⁶⁰ *Journal of Commerce*, Nov. 16, 1860.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Foner, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

⁶³ Two rather useful works on this election are S. D. Brummer, *Political History of the State of New York During the Period of the Civil War* (New York: Columbia University Studies, 1911), which contains a well documented account of the role played by slavery in New York politics, and Edward Stanwood, *History of the Presidential Elections, 1788 to 1897* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1898), a good treatment of the politics of the period with useful statistics on the breakdown of the voting.

Espartero

(Continued from page fifty-four)

on presenting his credentials to Queen Isabella in November, 1841, he met with an angry refusal that precipitated another diplomatic crisis. Aberdeen was furious and rebuked his minister at Madrid for not seeking a compromise, while Espartero's position was called "a

⁵⁹ The quotations used in connection with the Republican platform are taken from the platform as printed in Fite, *op. cit.*, appendix A, p. 237-240.

wretchedly sophistical quibble".²⁴ The Foreign Secretary was exasperated with the regent and wrote to Gordon at Vienna: "It is to him alone that we must look for the failure of our endeavors to give force and stability to the Spanish government."²⁵ All efforts to give Spain a European status failed on account of French obstruction and Aberdeen's unwitting connivance with it.

Under continued pressure from the manufacturers at home, the Foreign Office decided to make another effort at a commercial treaty. In November of 1841 new tariff laws had been passed in the Cortes that were unfavorable to British commerce; there were new duties on goods not carried in Spanish ships; a new list of prohibited commodities contained many British products. On October 25, 1842, Spain signed a convention with Belgium that gave her preference over other countries' linens. This caused a further loss to British textile interests. The protests of manufacturers were strong, and France was made the scapegoat for these injustices. A typical comment was the following:

France was the greatest smuggler of prohibited commodities into Spain but the smallest consumer. France thus robbed Spain of the revenue. France was not honorable enough to enter into a federation of interests or permit others to do so.²⁶

There were other reasons for the high tariff. The strength of Catalonia was the chief source of weakness within Spain under Espartero. The manufacturing interests were powerful in that province, and great sums were spent on bribery and press propaganda to keep the tariff high. France helped to foment suspicion against Britain and permitted large-scale smuggling of goods to satisfy its own manufacturing interests. Even British goods usually made illegal entry by way of Gibraltar. Fear of a British commercial treaty was so strong in Catalonia that a threat of open rebellion was made.²⁷

To complicate the situation further, Aston, the British Minister at Madrid made a serious blunder. In his zeal for concluding the treaty, he fostered the belief that the treaty would unite England and Spain more closely than ever before. This goaded Catalonian prejudices to a new pitch and embarrassed Aberdeen whose dislike of Espartero's liberalism was stronger²⁸ than his desire for the treaty. Guizot seemed but to have to stiffen Catalonian opposition and a crisis would develop in a short time.

This was precisely the case. The energy of M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French consul at Barcelona, and future commercial architect of the Suez Canal, had a formidable rebellion of *Carlistas* and *Cristinos* ripening in the north by November, 1842.²⁹ Aston reported to Aberdeen that the *Progresistas* believed the French assistance had a twofold objective: to prevent a British

commercial treaty and to cause the downfall of the regent. Again Aberdeen sought to conciliate the two countries after the bold assistance of de Lesseps had brought on talk of war. In a letter to Lord Cowley at Paris he hinted broadly that it would be best to remove de Lesseps from Barcelona.³⁰ But the Frenchman had done his work well and the damage was already too great.

Time was now against Espartero. His popularity had declined and his cruelty to the revolutionaries of the year before was still remembered. Because of his blunders in parliamentary procedure Espartero had been forced to prorogue the Cortes after many disputes. The military dictatorship that ensued was naturally against the principles of his own Liberal *Progresista* program. It was only a matter of time until a struggle between the military and parliamentary parties would develop. Britain, still associated popularly with the general, would be drawn in on the side of the army. Espartero would then be pinned down with a forked stick—France could play the dual role of constitutionalist and monarchist!

As the revolt assumed greater proportions, Espartero was forced to permit Christina to return to her former position as tutoress of the queen.³¹ The general might still have remained in office, were it not for his loss of control of the army, which by the lavish bribery of its senior officers had turned *Moderado* in opinion.³² By June, 1843, the cry "*Abajo Espartero!*" was being taken up by the army. Several regiments, deserted and sporadic insurrections in the south made the situation intolerable for the regent. He resigned and embarked from Cadiz on July 29, 1843, on a British ship to seek refuge in London.

The fall of Baldimiro Espartero, the first of Spain's military *caudillos*, was a spectacular political eclipse. The general, because of his political ignorance was hardly the type to maintain successfully a military dictatorship. From the outset Britain was unwise to expect so much from such incompetence. But the fundamental weakness in the strategy of the Foreign Office lay in the characters of the two Foreign Secretaries. Their policies were inconsistent because of their diametrically opposed political *credos*. Palmerston imagined Espartero as the Spanish member of a pro-British "Liberal bloc"; and so he formed an aggressive policy. Aberdeen breathed cold where Palmerston breathed hot. The new secretary was almost reactionary in his conservatism; he imagined with dread a Liberal revolution in Europe. In the prosecution of his own vague scheme of securing Spanish independence from France, by seeking the recognition of the Concert and disarming France by kindness, he was not sufficiently forceful.

Spain could not stand alone in the 1840s; either France or Britain had to become a partner of the party which controlled the crown. Though Guizot had to pay a heavy price in Spain in later years, the fall of Espartero in 1843 was a resounding victory for France.

²⁵ Aberdeen to Gordon, February 24, 1842, Parry, *Spanish Marriages*, p. 27.

²⁶ Anon. "Commercial Policy of Spain," *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, LIII (1843), 681-691.

²⁷ See "Account of Senator Marliani," in John MacGregor, *Commercial Tariffs and Regulations of the Several States of Europe* (London, 1844), part 13, pp. 53-56, for full details.

²⁸ Aberdeen to Lieven, December 27, 1842, C. A. L., p. 211.

²⁹ Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 345.

³⁰ Aberdeen to Cowley, February 14, 1843, *Ibid.*, p. 346.

³¹ Parry, *Spanish Marriages*, pp. 71, 78-9.

³² Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

Book Reviews

Ancient Christian Writers—The Works of the Fathers in Translation—The Didache, The Epistle of Barnabas, The Epistles and the Martyrdom of St. Polycarp, The Fragments of Papias, The Epistle to Diognetus. Newly Translated and Annotated by James A. Kleist, S.J., Ph.D. Westminster, Maryland. The Newman Press. 1948. pp. 235. \$2.75

This was the last work seen through the press by Father Kleist before his death in the spring of 1949. It has the accuracy, breadth, and understanding which we had come to expect from him. The translations themselves are a pleasure to read because their combination of simplicity in keeping with the original texts, and accuracy in the choice of expressions, especially those touching on points of dogma.

The *Didache* is in many respects the most interesting non-canonical work of early Christianity. Father Kleist's discussion of its age and the accuracy of its text is a lesson in scholarly workmanship. Here, especially, his knowledge of the dogmatic Eucharistic background is very evident. The work itself, as being "in all probability the oldest non-canonical literature", is of primary interest to the historian of early Christianity. It furnishes a background for Church organization and the methods of approach to the non-Christian world which were to come to flower in the great Patristic writers of a later date.

The subject matter of the *Epistle of Barnabas* is more topical than that of the *Didache*. Written apparently in the reign of Hadrian (117-138 A.D.), it deals with an apparent Judaizing tendency or danger of such which threatened a certain Christian community. It is a "homily on the mistaken Judaistic conception of the Old Testament". More controversial in tone than the *Didache*, the work shows a keen concern where matters of faith are concerned. From the manuscript evidence this work was highly thought of in the early Church. However, despite its title, it was never included among the canonical writings. Its author's conception of the Old Testament can be attacked as wanting in proper respect for the inspired writings, and hence as not apostolic in tone. However, he may be defended because of the topical nature of the work, on the ground that his flat denials of the utility of the Law are to be understood in the same sense as they are in the epistle to the Hebrews.

The third selection of the book, that on St. Polycarp, bears a comparison with the letters of St. Ignatius to Smyrna. The subject matter of Polycarp's letter is primarily insistence on purity of faith and the avoidance of avarice. The *Martyrdom* is the earliest example of the *Acta Martyrum* that has come down to us. It is "remarkably free from the legendary accretions so common in later *Acta*".

The *Fragments of Papias*, with the exception of the second, are of comparative unimportance. In an earlier study (St. Louis Univ. Studies, Ser. A; Humanities I, 1945) Father Kleist had already discussed the relation

of this second fragment to St. Mark. It is of special importance because of the stress it lays on oral tradition as a source of knowledge in the early Church.

The final selection, the *Epistle to Diognetus*, is an apologetic work, dating apparently from early in the second century. Its author is uncertain, as is its recipient. The latter, whether meant as an individual or as a class, was evidently considered to be pagan of high social or political rank. Among early Christian writers there is a curious lack of external evidence concerning this work, despite its beauty of style and its testimony to the faith. Its doctrinal content is not great. Its chief appeal is its exposition of the attractiveness of the Christian life and the love of God manifested through the Church.

EDMUND F. BURKE.

The New Renaissance of the Spirit, by Vincent A. McCrossen. New York. Philosophical Library. 1949. pp. x, 252. \$3.00

This book is hard to classify. The author is a professor of comparative languages who from his studies has arrived at a philosophy of history—or better, perhaps, a theology of history. He is not so much concerned with telling us how we came to be what we are, though he is forced to do that, as with telling how to achieve a better society in the future. This involves plunges into history, sociology, religion, philosophy, ethics, and all those other subjects dealing with man and God.

Dr. McCrossen has written an excellent book, one replete with Christian wisdom and informed with a solid sense of values. The first chapter is rather unfortunate, in its phraseology more than anything else, but toward the end of it the reader begins to appreciate the solidity and the common sense of the author's message. His thesis, briefly, is that we live in an age of transition between a sensate culture and a spiritual one. Our immediate future is bound, by the nature of things, to be a time of trial and troubles; but if a large enough proportion of us realize the juncture at which we live and if we can impose on the world the right standards of judgment, then the transition into the spiritual culture need not be as hellish as it now threatens to be.

The author draws from history to show how these cultures—the sensate and the spiritual—have alternated in the past and how they are bound to do so in the future. But he sees perhaps three or four centuries ahead before the world will enter into the new renaissance of the spirit. It is to give men hope in these days and to make our time of transition less severe that he has written this book.

THOMAS P. NEILL.

Erasmus, Tyndale and More, by W. E. Campbell. Milwaukee. The Bruce Publishing Company. 1949. pp. 228. \$5.00

At last the reader has a scholarly and significant book on the three great *uomini universali* of the Renaissance-Reformation period in England. It is a recompense for

the many recent derivative compilations *a la mode* Theodore Maynard on the subject, which have not added anything important to the traditional view by way of quantitative or qualitative information. The announcement of a re-edition of Chamber's *Thomas More* may be a further portent of the good things that are to come.

There is nothing of the tyro about Mr. Campbell. His book reflects the fruits of long study, a thorough grasp of the primary sources, mature judgment, and the marks of a man thoroughly intimate with and devoted to the great careers he is depicting. In only one respect does the author distress the reader. His citations, though unusual, *apropos* and beautifully adapted to his general purpose, are too numerous and too long. They are not made for the sake of ostentation, and they occur in the text; but it does uncomfortably remind one of the historical method of the late Father Peter Gilday, otherwise a really good historian—a page and a half of quotation, a half-page of Fr. Gilday, three pages of quotation, a line or two of Gilday *et sic porro*. Mr. Campbell does not transgress the canons of continuity, transition and attention focussing to the degree that Gilday does, but the frequency and length of his quotations constitute a grievous fault all the same, and a fault which has a devastating effect upon the work of a scholar who seems to be one of those rare people who believe in *ars gratia artis*. One might feel apologetic for such criticism were it not the business of the reviewer to give an honest criticism where and when an author deserves it. We must not let book-reviewing degenerate into the pleasantries of the mutual admirationists of the *fin de siècle*. Flatterers and the love-to-be-flattered we have always with us, and so the truth has to be faced. For instance: the author of a recent life of Henry VIII must not be told he is good, else he will keep on writing; the author of a genuinely excellent book on *Erasmus, More and Tyndale* must be told his faults so that he will keep on writing.

In the plan of Mr. Campbell's book *More* is made the focal figure round whom Erasmus and Tyndale revolve. *More's* relationship with Erasmus was one of deep attachment towards the eminent scholar in whom he saw the hope *par excellence* of the Church for diverting the new learning from pagan channels into a new synthesis of Christian humanism that would be, in *More's* opinion, more firmly linked to the simple doctrines and practices of the Church of the Fathers than was the synthesis of the medieval schoolmen. Erasmus for his part loved *More* as a saint, a charming conversationalist, an intellectual equal, and a great man. *More's* connection with Tyndale, to which a great part of the book is devoted, has to do with the controversy in which the foremost exponent of the old faith in England engages in a long-drawn-out religious polemic with the man whom the author regards as the outstanding protestant of Henry VIII's time. This will be somewhat of a shock to the many who have heard so much about Cranmer while they know little about Tyndale. But Campbell demonstrates the superiority of Tyndale over Cranmer to the point where there can not be any doubt about it.

Our author sees in Erasmus as well as *More* the unwearying proponent of the reformation of the Church

from within. Each man recognized Lutheranism almost at once as rebellion and Luther as the enemy of his own life work. With due respect to the vast erudition of the author, however, he ought to have given more attention to the early relations of Erasmus with Luther which were not unfriendly. He might also have shown that in the controversy over justification-by-faith-alone and the freedom-of-the-will, Erasmus was a disappointment. His treatise *De Libero Arbitrio* against Luther was not one of his best. Neither was his *Hyperaspites* in answer to Luther's reply *Man's Will not Free*. Erasmus did not exactly fail a whole Church that expected him to lead the assault on Luther, but what Campbell calls his pacifism—moral cowardice would probably be more like it—prevented him from being an effective champion. Campbell's really high estimate of Erasmus as a Catholic, based as it is on contemporary sources, may be the starting point of a new appraisal of the great Dutchman. Erasmus was, he asserts, one of the Church's "most learned, most moderate and most loyal children." Heretofore the Catholic estimate of Erasmus has placed him closer to Alexander Pope's "the glory of the Priesthood and the Shame" than to Thomas *More's* "darling"—"the best hope of the Church." In Erasmus' case *More* was too much of an *amicus certus in re incerta* to be the very best judge of his significance. One might venture to remark also that Campbell does not give the same evidence of familiarity with the writings of Erasmus that he does with those of *More* and Tyndale. This might have revealed to him Erasmus' humanism absorbing his Catholicism rather than vice versa. This remark is made with some trepidation, however, because our author's faults and weaknesses as over against his vast erudition and learned opinions are like the wart on Cromwell's nose.

Mr. Campbell gives us a thorough introduction into the lives of Erasmus, *More* and Tyndale. No point of importance remains unsifted. His analysis of *More's* writings is the very best that has appeared in English, and he does not fail to give a vivid picture of the impact of Lutheranism, first imported into England by Tyndale, upon the Catholic reform movement already well under way there. To do all this and to do it with clarity, measure and balance in a book of only two hundred and seventy-nine pages of text is a great accomplishment indeed.

Mr. Campbell's book is not entirely an attractive printing job. There are many typographical errors, and the index calls for improvement. But the book itself can hardly be praised highly enough when it comes to scholarship, judgment, and the new facets of character revealed by the author from sources which have already been intensively explored. Mr. Campbell throws new light on Renaissance England and on its three chief luminaries. *Erasmus, Tyndale and More* will long remain a standard of scholarship.

THOMAS L. COONAN.

State Intervention in Great Britain. A Study of Economic Control and Social Response, 1914-1919, by Samuel J. Hurwitz. New York. Columbia University Press. 1949. pp. 321

The idea of state intervention in war is not new. Tiglath-pileser of Assyria thought state intervention so sound an idea that he continued it after one of his wars with the Jews as a sort of *new deal* for the peoples of his empire. Julius Caesar had a hankering for it. The mercantile state was a form of it. The government of the younger Mr. Pitt practiced it in order to galvanize the British into an all-out effort against Napoleon. Finally, there is no end of books on the subject. Yet *State Intervention in Great Britain* by Mr. Hurwitz is a timely book if only to bring home to the advocates of *laissez-faire* the helplessness of the party and parliamentary system and the ineptness of rugged individualism in times of war and depression. The reaffirmation of total war in 1939 as an instrument of national policy, and the menace of a still greater war on the horizon should of necessity impel them, unless they wish to remain *caeci et duces caecorum*, to regard the regimentation of peoples and institutions for a total effort as something inescapable as long as international peace continues to be a mere truce between wars.

The book under review is a monographic study of the impact of the First World War on the role of government in the economy of a country which was the prototype of modern industrial society. The British government knew even before the outbreak of the war in 1914 that the impending struggle was going to be no mere affair of armies and navies, but of people and institutions, comprehending all the activities of society. Yet so devoted was the rank and file of the Liberal party to the ghost of *laissez-faire* that the state was reluctant to respond fully to the imperatives of war until the war was almost lost by the Allies. The average middle-class Englishman was alarmed lest government controls should lead to dictatorship. And so the development of government controls was slow and halting, but nevertheless inexorable and, by 1918, complete. Since the author sees the First World War as a prototype of future wars, his fundamental purpose is to use Britain as a representative case history. Britain's response to that war is seen as helping to establish the pattern of response for the future. Accordingly, Mr. Hurwitz' study is a monograph of more than academic concern.

The chapter entitled "A Decade of Liberalism" is the author's best. Herein he shows that the slackening of British trade and industry as contrasted with the acceleration so evident in Germany and the United States, had brought about a decrease in real wages together with the prospect of economic decline. This prospect was the matrix of many other problems such as imperial strains, foreign dangers, labor disputes, and when the growing unrest in Ireland and the militant suffragette movement were added, the cumulative effect was to paralyze government. In this respect *prima facie* the outbreak of the war must have appeared to some of the political leaders as a relief from the apparently insoluble domestic problems which were leading the country to the brink of civil war. Mr. Hurwitz might have pointed out that this situation was by no means confined to England. Socialism in France and Germany, syndical-

ism in Italy, autonomist agitation and irredentism in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and menshevism in Russia were leading in precisely the same direction. Why? The author only hints at the root cause, and this is the real weakness of his book. The peoples of Europe were everywhere on the march to end the monopoly of the rich by a redistribution of wealth and power. The author alludes, though not too knowingly, to the fact that as early as 1910 Lloyd George was angling for a national coalition of the Liberals and the Conservatives as a way out of the impasse. Throughout the book, but for the most part in footnotes, the author cites passages from the speeches of Lloyd George, Winston Churchill and of other Liberal leaders who were convinced that no amount of social legislation could win over labor to the Liberal banner. Labor in England, like socialism on the Continent, wanted political power and economic management. *Laissez-faire* with its freedom of trade and of capitalistic enterprise was in its death throes. State intervention on a wide scale and the welfare state were in the offing.

Nobody will deny Mr. Hurwitz' thesis that the development of economic controls by Great Britain between 1914 and 1918, by adumbrating the future, provides lessons for our day "in war, in preparation for war, and for that matter, in peace." But there are a few interrelated questions of great import that the very idea of state intervention suggests and on which Mr. Hurwitz might have attempted to enlighten his readers. Are state intervention and the welfare state forms of totalitarianism? Are they permanent governmental trends *per se*? Is the welfare state ultimately workable within the framework of political democracy? Are government controls not a form of neo-mercantilism? These are the problems that are everywhere haunting the mentality of the middle classes. The author of *State Intervention in Great Britain* fails to give the answers. Maybe they are outside the scope of his study, but solutions might have been suggested by way of *obiter dicta*.

Mr. Hurwitz' book is overdone with Wissenschaft, and it seems to the reviewer that had some of it been incorporated into the text, the study might have been more revealing. There is a formidable bibliography attached but without any indication as to the relative value of secondary material. The book makes dry reading, is brutally factual and statistical, and supplies scant effort to the task of lifting economics out of the pedantic slough which has earned for one of the most significant of studies the designation of the dismal science. The "inexorable laws" of economics have submerged Dr. Hurwitz' vision and humor. After reading this book I am afraid the average student will feel in lacrimose sympathy with the *Waltus* who was so kindly disposed to the *Oysters* that

"With sobs and tears he sorted out
Those of the larger size,
Holding his pocket handkerchief
Before his streaming eyes."

THOMAS L. COONAN.

A Balkan Mission, by James T. Shotwell. New York. Columbia University Press. 1949. pp. 180. \$2.25

Although there are some fairly good books and noteworthy monographs about modern politics in South-eastern Europe in the English language, there is hardly any comprehensive and entirely unbiased treatise of Southeastern European history. J. T. Shotwell's book, "A Balkan Mission"—the narrative of a journey through the Balkans in the autumn of 1925—of course does not help us much to close the gap, although it is of some value for additional reading.

The record of this informative trip is drawn from original notes and letters, with the added texts of two lectures given at the University of Belgrade and the Institut social de Bucharest, as well as excerpts from articles of a contributing Serbian (D. Yovanovich) and a Turkish (Ahmed Emin) scholar. In summary it might be said that a perfect and legible diction, a presentation of the matter in a carefully arranged and organized manner, adequately chosen illustrations, and a well-done index facilitate pleasant reading.

J. T. Shotwell started his work, obviously intended to be fully objective, as a sort of emissary of the League of Nations policy, mainly concerned with assuring the full cooperation of national experts on a strictly scholarly basis. Of course, his irremovable starting point had been the setting up of the political map of the Balkan countries as achieved by the Paris Treaties. In 1925 this kind of a solution might well have been considered a desirable and endurable optimum. There was, then, still some hope of avoiding another "war of aggression", a hope particularly strong among Americans.

Perhaps Mr. Shotwell realized during his journey in 1925 that there were some handicaps in transferring one's pre-established Western way of thinking to the Balkans; maybe he did not. After all, his highly idealistic proclamation of a new and more efficient international law got full appraisal; it was sometimes enthusiastically, always at least politely, applauded, depending on the nationality of his audiences.

The Balkan peninsula covers a territory slightly larger than California; at its largest extent it reaches, by comparison with the American map, somewhat from the eastern borders of the State of Missouri to the western counties of Pennsylvania, with a total population of approximately 45 millions.

Not only language, habits, folklore, physical appearance, but a real cultural borderline divides Balkan people. Shotwell—presumably in behalf of his mission—pays no attention to this obvious and undeniable fact, an indispensable premise for any correct and complete evaluation of the Balkan situation. Even if he wants to forget about, or at least carefully avoids drawing any conclusions, his narrative e. g. about Montenegro in the west and Rumania in the east shows that he was aware of the entirely different civilizations. He tells us that he was not going to "investigate international questions like these of minorities . . . or difficulties in the field of practical politics" (p. 10). Indeed, what he has written is the well-styled report of an ambassador of good will who carefully avoids touching any vulnerable spots.

There is not much information about the Macedonian question, although one chapter, "Visit to Macedonia", gives a fair insight as to local characteristics and administrative progress in a Serbian version; the Bulgarian and Greek views of the problem are very summarily dealt with, and this only as concerns the *status quo* policy of the League of Nations. But for a few, rather discreet, hints there is hardly any mention of sometimes turbulent inner dissensions in Yugoslavia, particularly connected with the Croat and Slovene federalistic claims. The chapter "Visit to Zagreb" offers not much more than an impressive characterization of the Croat leader Stephan Raditch. Furthermore, the reader learns nothing about the existence of a most serious German and Magjar minority problem in these regions, which is most important for a thorough understanding of the events of the later thirties.

As far as Austria is concerned, the statement that Austrian administration (1878 until 1918 in Bosnia) was a "Germanic" one (pp. 37ff.) is highly debatable. As a matter of fact, during the period of attempted Germanization during the 18th century there was no Austrian control on the Balkans, and after Austria took over in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878), local government officials, including military commanders, were mostly of Croat extraction. Furthermore, it is an undeniable fact that Bosnia under Austrian administration—until 1918—made progress and the people there were quite well off as compared with Old Serbia. Austria spent much money in developing her new provinces, particularly in the field of public communications and rural amelioration. As a matter of fact, about 46% of the total population then had been of Greek Orthodox faith; this means predominantly Serbians, whereas 33% were Mohammedans and 20% Catholic Croats.

As a whole, Shotwell's report gives an interesting, well-done piece of information. It is certainly inspired by the very best intentions, and obviously purports to promote high ideals. It is the work of a scholar, by no means more misleading than any other attempt to stabilize the intrinsically unstable situation between the two wars. As far as the special Balkan Mission is concerned, in the light of the facts we now know, it is the candid report of a failure.

_____ K. SCHUSCHNIGG.

Earlier Diplomatic History (1492-1713) and Diplomatic History (1713-1933), by Sir Charles Petrie. New York. The Macmillan Company. 1949. pp. xii, 251; xii, 384. \$2.75 per volume.

The second of these volumes was originally published in 1946. It is republished now uniformly with the first volume, which was written to supplement the second and to offer the student a comprehensive coverage of European diplomatic history from the beginnings of modern times until the advent of Adolph Hitler.

The author eschews all political and military history not required for an understanding of international relations, and thus he manages to compress into these two volumes an adequate survey of international relations among the European countries. The chief objection to this work is that it is only a survey. Thus the student

will find in it relatively little information he cannot find in the larger textbooks or in the various national histories of the European countries. Information pertinent to diplomatic history has been sifted out of the general histories by Sir Charles Petrie and presented in readable style. The presentation is balanced; it is a factual account, by and large, with the author not trying to press home any particular theory upon the reader.

Each volume contains five or six excellent maps and a good index—a most important item, we believe, in volumes of this nature. The bibliographies are not of any great value. A few books are recommended as additional reading for each chapter, and they are almost all solid, semi-popular works. No mention is made of the sources from which diplomatic history is ultimately drawn, such as peace treaties, alliances, letters of diplomats, and the like.

These two volumes will prove helpful for the student of history and perhaps for the high school and elementary school teacher desirous of obtaining additional information on this complex subject of European diplomatic history.

THOMAS P. NEILL.

The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism in Germany, Italy, and Poland, by Hannah Alice Straus. New York. Columbia University Press. 1949. pp. 164. \$2.75.

Nationalism was one of the two secular religions produced by the French Revolution, and it therefore was bound to play some part—positively or negatively—in the Congress of Vienna. In the past, historians tended to assume that the diplomats at Vienna ignored this new current of thought, and they usually claimed that this was one of the Congress' worst mistakes. More recently, however, it has been discovered that the diplomats were very much aware of the power of nationalism, that some of them wanted to make concessions to it, that others were forced by the nature of things to oppose it.

This dissertation studies the problem of nationalism as it was presented at Vienna in relation to Germany, Italy, and Poland. The problem is not the same in each country. There had been no united Italy since Roman times, but Napoleon had stirred up national feeling there. A Poland existed as late as 1795, but that unhappy land was caught in the power-politics squeeze between Prussia and Russia. There was a cultural Germany, but no political nation in 1815. Miss Straus examines the arguments advanced by the proponents of nationalism, and by its opponents, in regard to all three nationalities. Her study is well done, her conclusions seem sound, and she reveals some information not readily available to the ordinary student or teacher. Her conclusions, however, are about what one would expect from work already done around this subject: that nationalism was not as strong a current as it was soon to become; that its proponents used it (Prussia and Russia for example) for selfish reasons of political aggrandizement, just as its opponents were against it for the same reason.

The great value of this book is its revelation that

there were varieties of nationalism as early as 1815, just as there were varieties of reasons for various groups proposing or denouncing nationalism. It shows that nationalism is an ideology which cannot properly be isolated from the political and social context in which it grows up.

THOMAS P. NEILL.

The Emancipation of the Austrian Peasant, 1740-1798, by Edith Murr Link. New York. Columbia University Press. 1949. pp. 203. \$3.00

The author's unbiased and interesting study offers a valuable contribution for a better understanding of eighteenth-century Central European political history. The social situation was fairly the same all over Central Europe so that the German provinces of the former Hapsburg possessions for the respective period can easily and rightly serve as a model. Actually the book deals with what is called "Inner-Austria" or the central Austrian provinces, and not so much with the Tyrol and Vorarlberg where just like in neighboring Switzerland a genuine democratic tradition and an entirely different land distribution had long since brought a free and independent peasantry into existence. The carefully selected and near exhaustive bibliography indicates that more recent Tyrolensia, published by H. Wopfner, Otto Stolz, Helbock, *et al.* (research work about agrarian constitution) might not have been available to the author and so we learn, except a few and correct casual remarks, not too much about the situation in the western (Alpine) territories among the Hapsburg possessions.

A special value of the study from a merely historical angle and for the student of comparative political history lies in its contribution to a better insight into often misunderstood facts: The paternalistic state of absolutism during the enlightenment period should, indeed, not be exclusively considered as the embodiment of a mainly bureaucratically inspired power-philosophy; the concept of sovereignty was widely influenced by what we would consider nowadays a Welfare-State ideology. Agrarian reforms and a remodeling of the outdated feudal landowner-peasant relations were then the main social, economical, political and fiscal issues. Furthermore, since the traditional feudalistic order stood for a federalism whose continental European version (except in Switzerland, Tyrol Vorarlberg) meant wide local particularism, the State, for foreign-political and cameralistic reasons, resorted to centralization. Central government sided with the peasants against their local lords and thereby against local government. This explains to a great extent the emergence of an eventually all-powerful central bureaucracy, the outstanding feature of any absolutist system. To be sure, after emancipation of the peasants was accomplished and other social problems superseded the agrarian problem, it would have been wise to abandon or at least to loosen the strictly centralist methods. The free farmer, despite and because of his innate conservative tendencies, soon turned to local government ideals, became a strong supporter of federalism and resented bureaucratic infringements just as in former times he had resented his local de-

pendency. But central government, frightened by the impact of a strange nationalist-liberal combination of opposing political forces, tried to deal with him just as its predecessor in the eighteenth century had successfully dealt with the half-sovereign nobles; as a result the government showed a deplorable lack of vision and versatility; over anxiously holding to centralism, and therewith to absolutism, it committed the most fateful mistake which finally was to precipitate Central-European disintegration.

The author stresses the cameralistic interest of central government in the liberation of the peasants and points to Maria Theresa's writing in 1748 that, unless the conditions were changed, "the subject, oppressed in so many ways, would be ruined and the tax-system necessarily disrupted. . . ." (p. 36). The comparative evaluation of the agrarian reforms under Maria Theresa and the political thought of her son Joseph II gives the impression that Maria Theresa was in first place concerned with the material welfare of the State, whereas Joseph II's idealism had concentrated on the welfare of the people. It is certainly true, that Maria Theresa was an "unphilosophical mind" (p. 186) and, therefore, perhaps not a really "conscious reformer." But she was nearer to life with her entirely unsophisticated manner; her popularity unlike that of the "People's emperor" was not afterwards bestowed on her as sort of an honorary title for actual or alleged political merits, but rather it grew out of her popular, commonly understood and appreciated way of thinking. Even if she considered the emancipation of the peasants as necessary for the State's welfare, she most definitely started from the feeling that improvement of their general situation was an urgent command of equity and justice. Whereas Maria Theresa tried spontaneously to adjust policy to truly Christian principles, Joseph II went deliberately the other way by making Christian ideas subservient to his idealistic French-inspired motto: "Reason and Humanity." Joseph II's failure, as far as the continuous progress of his social reforms is concerned (actually they were interrupted until the final achievements of 1848 with the full abolition of all kind of dues and services to the owners) was not so much caused by the fact that "his reign had been followed by that of Francis II and Metternich" (p. 189) as by the fact that it had been followed by the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, and their impact on Central European development.

The author hints at the different degrees of lack of freedom among peasants. As a matter of fact, there was a substantial difference between slavery, serfdom, with an if even badly limited amount of personal and economic freedom, and hereditary subjection, a milder and restricted form of serfdom. A great deal depended on local and personal conditions. The student interested in the different forms of "bondage to the soil," the services and various burdens involved as they existed throughout the pre-reform period, will certainly find adequate profit in the substantial information offered by the author. This holds also as far as the different and gradual administrative and judicial reforms are concerned, the question of labor services and the complex

problem of manorial dues, the tax-reform and the principles of inheritance, mortgaging, sale and exchange of peasant property, and eventually the abrogation of preemption and reversionary rights.

The author concludes by quoting Gustav Schmoller (*Die soziale Frage.*, Munich, 1918), who thus describes the emancipation of the Austrian peasant under Maria Theresa and Joseph II as "the greatest social reform in German history before the advent of social legislation in the second half of the nineteenth century."

K. SCHUSCHNIGG.

Problems in American Civilization, Readings Selected by the Department of American Studies, Amherst College, prepared under the editorship of Earl Latham, George Rogers Taylor and George F. Whicher. Boston. D. C. Heath and Company. 1949. \$1.00 each volume.

1. *The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution*, edited with an introduction by Earl Latham. pp. 118.
2. *The Turner Thesis Concerning the Role of the Frontier in American History*, edited with an introduction by George Rogers Taylor. pp. 106.
3. *Jackson versus Biddle—The Struggle Over the Second Bank of the United States*, edited with an introduction by George Rogers Taylor. pp. 119.
4. *The Transcendentalist Revolt Against Materialism*, edited with an introduction by George F. Whicher. pp. 107.
5. *Slavery as a Cause of the Civil War*, edited with an introduction by Edwin C. Rozwenc. pp. 104.
6. *Democracy and the Gospel of Wealth*, edited with an introduction by Gail Kennedy. pp. 116.
7. *John D. Rockefeller—Robber Baron or Industrial Statesman?* edited with an introduction by Earl Latham. pp. 115.
8. *The New Deal—Revolution or Evolution?* edited with an introduction by Edwin C. Rozwenc. pp. 113.

These lines are not meant to be a review of the individual volumes of this series. Rather they are designed to call attention of teachers and students to a new and very interesting set of small paper-bound volumes which can be made to serve a variety of exceptionally useful purposes. The books might be used in a "problem approach" to United States history. Again, they may supply some extremely fine readings to parallel such a course. And still again, they can be used as a ready set of references, containing some of the most important documents and the most penetrating observations on selected American topics and personalities.

A quick analysis of the contents of one of the volumes will indicate the general mode of presentation. Take as sample *The Turner Thesis*. The editor first reproduces the famous essay of Turner which launched his ideas on the American westward movement: "The Significance of the Frontier in American History." This is followed by another Turner essay, "Contributions of the West to American Democracy." With these works of the master before him the student can go on to read evaluations, pro and con, of the "Turner thesis" by such men as Frederic Paxson, Benjamin F. Wright, Jr., Fred A. Shannon, Louis M. Hacker, George Wilson Pierson, Avery Craven. The editor also includes the penetrating study of Carleton J. H. Hayes, "The American Frontier—Frontier of What?" his presidential address before the American Historical Association in 1945 and a most interesting reaction of a

"European historian" to the idea which has so profoundly affected United States historiography in the last half century. Each volume of the series culls in like fashion the best thought on the given topic.

The Department of American Studies of Amherst should be congratulated for the stimulation offered to the teacher who would like to revitalize his course in United States history. The publishers should be lauded for making valuable historical tools available at a price which is not so prohibitive that a teacher need hesitate to ask the student to procure an aid beyond the assigned textbook.

JOHN F. BANNON.

The Church and State in Guatemala, by Mary P. Holle-
ran. New York. Columbia University Press. 1949.
pp. 359. \$4.75

The story of the relationships between Church and State in any one of the Latin American countries is a valuable contribution. Too little study in the past, in English at least, has been given to this important phase of Latin American history. And on the reverse side, too many judgments, with little or no foundation in sound historical research, have been made and have set the pattern for categorizing concerning a most complex set of events. Uninformed or poorly informed authors are too ready solve with a personal *fiat* a situation in most instances still satisfactorily untangled. Neither party to the rivalry has always been correct: the State has made mistakes, and so has the Church. An objective presentation of the facts must be primarily both to understanding and appreciation of the difficulties involved.

The author has marshaled an imposing collection of facts to portray Church-State relationships at various stages of Guatemalan history—in the days of the colony when the *Patronato Real* was the norm; the situation on the eve of independence; the conflict of the two powers during the first period of Liberal ascendancy, in the days when Morazán was in control or while his spirit lasted; the age of Conservative rule, the days of Carrera; finally, the Barrios period, which extends, in general attitudes, down to the present writing. A closing chapter is the author's attempt to analyze, not so much the current status of Church-State relations, as to interpret the religious condition of modern Guatemala. The work shows much careful research and on-the-spot investigation, but the author does not do justice to her preparation. The study is unevenly written and, at times, unnecessarily painful to follow. More careful order in the valuable materials of the appendix would have made that section of the book a great deal more useful. The chronological and topical tables are very helpful.

JOHN F. BANNON.

Edmund Pendleton Gaines: Frontier General, by James
W. Silver. Baton Rouge. Louisiana State University
Press. 1949. pp. xxi, 291. \$4.50.

A native of Culpeper County, Virginia, Edmund Pendleton Gaines grew to manhood in the frontier country of East Tennessee. In 1797 he entered the United States army and during the remaining half century of his life rendered distinguished and often colorful service

to the national defense. At the turn of the century he directed the survey of a new road from Nashville to Natches along the general route of the old Natches Trace. In the War of 1812 he conducted the effective defense of Fort Eve, on the Niagara frontier. In the South and West he took a prominent part in the engagements against the Creeks and Seminoles, in the Black Hawk War of 1832, in the military preparations occasioned by the Texans' declaration of independence, and in the Mexican War.

Despite his notable contributions to the national defense and his high rank—he was made a brigadier-general with a major-general's brevet—Gaines became one of the most controverted figures in American military annals. A man of uninhibited forthrightness, he scorned the tested amenities of social behavior, especially in his dealings with military and civil superiors, and his pen was perennially dipped in wormwood. The resentment of those whom he castigated, which was in part motivated, undoubtedly, by professional jealousy, gained for him a large and influential group of articulate adversaries, including General Winfield Scott, "Old Fuss and Feathers" of army lore.

The tradition of those acrimonious altercations has survived so enduringly throughout the century following his death as to overshadow all other phases of Gaines' career. It has, in particular, obscured his very real contributions to the development of the West. Mr. Silver's volume, the first adequate biographical study of Gaines, is a highly successful effort to analyze and set forth the significant aspects of his subject's military life. Shorn of the mists of controversy, the Virginia-born general emerges as an unusually enlightened frontier figure. Two deeply rooted convictions of his mature years are set forth in this volume with such clarity and abundance of first-class documentation as to compel a thoroughgoing revision of the hitherto accepted conception of Gaines' place in the history of the frontier. The one was his appreciation of the necessity of a more extensive program of internal improvements, roads, canals, bridges, the improvement of existing waterways, and especially of railroads, in the western country. These projects he urged with all the ardor of a crusader, often to the annoyance of his superiors. The second was his attitude toward the Indian problem. With all the energy of his nature he set himself against the removal policy of the federal administration. The Indian, he maintained, should be protected against the rapacity of the white settlers. Education and training, particularly in the techniques of agriculture, rather than military restraint, would, he urged, effect a solution of this major frontier problem.

Mr. Silver has written what will long remain the definitive work on Gaines' turbulent career. The data is drawn almost exclusively from primary sources. References and explanatory notes are placed where they belong, at the foot of the page. A general description of the types of sources used is contained in a bibliographical note. The volume is provided with a number of carefully executed maps and plans, and with a very good index.

THOMAS F. O'CONNOR.

Book Notices

The United States in World History, by John B. Rae and Thomas H. D. Mahoney. New York. McGraw-Hill Co. 1949. pp. xv, 813. \$5.00.

This work, written by two professors of history at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accomplishes its purpose in being an American history with "considerable stress placed on the interrelationship between the United States and the rest of the world". Certain fields, as literature and culture, often included in such texts are passed over lightly. This is done consciously in order to stress political and economic developments.

The work contains an adequate index and a number of serviceable maps. C. J. R.

Documents of American History. 5th Edition. Edited by Henry Steele Commager. New York. Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1949. pp. xxiii, 759. \$5.00.

No justification is needed at this late date for such a well-selected collection as Commager's *Documents of American History*. In the latest (fifth) edition, addition of new material has made the well-known work more serviceable for contemporary demands. The present edition more than ever embodies all the documents that are basically assential to a scholar in the general field of American history, plus others of service to the specialist, say, in constitutional, diplomatic or economic history. C. J. R.

Four Essays, by Benjamin J. Blied. Milwaukee. Privately printed. 1949. pp. 69. \$1.00

Father Blied himself explains the purpose of these *Four Essays*: "Their objective is to answer popularly rather than exhaustively a question which is seldom asked: What did Catholics think and do in the epochal years of 1776, 1812, 1846 and 1898?" He is known for his splendid work *Catholics and the Civil War*; these essays turn him into an authority on Catholics and four other conflicts which have dotted the pages of the United States story. His essays suggest several fruitful areas of research for Catholic scholars and point the way into the "unknown."

J. F. B.

Chaminade, Apostle of Mary, by Katherine Burton. Milwaukee. The Bruce Publishing Company. 1949. pp. 249. \$3.00

It is often of advantage to members of a religious family to have their founder analyzed and his influence assayed by an "outsider." This life of their founder, Father William Joseph Chaminade, by the very capable Katherine Burton can serve such a good purpose for the members of the Society of Mary (Marianists). And to the historian it offers an interesting picture of one of the truly great men of France's important first half of the nineteenth century. The age was not one noted for its esteem of spiritual values and ideals; hence, it

is refreshing to see in Father Chaminade a force which sought, against great odds, to keep alive those very things which had made France great. Historians of education, particularly, will find many interesting pages in this work, to tell of Chaminade's ideas and of the powerful and fruitful educational organization which he launched.

J. F. B.

J. L. M. Curry: Southerner, Statesman and Educator, by Jessie Pearl Rice. New York. King's Crown Press. 1949. pp. xi, 242. \$3.50

Miss Rice has presented a clear, detailed uncritical biography of a pre-Civil War political leader and post-war educator, principally noted as an administrator of the George Peabody Fund.

The work is well done. Material is mainly from the J. L. M. Curry papers in the Library of Congress and elsewhere, which seem to have been thoroughly covered. Footnoting is well done and contains useful additional information incidental to the major topic.

J. W. C.

The Story of Illinois, by Theodore Calvin Pease. Chicago. University of Chicago Press. 1949. pp. xviii, 284. \$5.00

This is the Fiftieth Anniversary Publication of the Illinois State Historical Society, a revision and continuation of the 1925 edition. Those who knew the late Dr. Pease as a teacher and as a friend will regret that no more of his rolling prose or deep scholarship will appear. The thoroughness of his research and the picturesqueness of his person made him respected and liked by academic generations at the University of Illinois.

The Story of Illinois needs no review. It is an excellent piece of work, and its selection as the anniversary publication is a well-deserved tribute to a gentleman and a scholar.

J. W. C.

India from the Dawn, by Mariadas Ruthnaswamy. Milwaukee. The Bruce Publishing Company. 1949. pp. xii, 205. \$3.00

India has long been a mysterious land to Westerners. Today, given the recent developments which have brought her to a status of nationhood in the world family, she can no longer be allowed to remain such. Western man must come to recognize her problems that his attitudes and judgments regarding her may be sound. Many of these problems are deeply rooted in her historical past. The present volume seeks to interpret that past in terms which all may understand and within physical limits which are far from forbidding. The author, one of India's prominent Catholic leaders, has performed the task of interpreting his country and its history in most laudable fashion. For a quick road to an understanding of India this book is highly recommended.

J. F. B.